Good QUEEN ANNE *vindicated,*

AND

The Ingratitude, Inſolence, &c.

OF HER

WHIG MINISTRY

AND THE

ALLIES

Detected and Expoſed, in the Beginning and Conducting of the WAR.

THE

ENGLISHMAN's MEMORIAL:

CONTAINING

A *ſhort Hiſtory* of the LAND WARS we have been engaged in, with unanſwerable Arguments, proving 'tis not the Intereſt of *England* to be concerned, as a Principal, in a Land War, upon any Pretence whatſoever — MIND THE SEA.

WITH

Remarks on the new Ways of raiſing Money, &c. (unknown to our Anceſtors, and which our Poſterity will curſe us for;)

ALSO

Many important Matters relative to the *Britiſh* Affairs, worthy of the Attention of the Publick at this Juncture.

By the AUTHOR *of* the Diſſertation on Parties.

DUBLIN:

Printed for G. FAULKNER, in *Eſſex-ſtreet*, E. and J. EXSHAW, on *Cork-Hill*, and R. JAMES, in *Dame-ſtreet*, oppoſite *Sycamore-Alley*. MDCCXLVIII.

THE

CONDUCT of the MINISTRY

And their Allies detected, &c.

THE Motives that may engage a wiſe Prince or State in a War, I take to be one or more of theſe: Either to check the overgrown Power of ſome ambitious Neighbour; to recover what hath been unjuſtly taken from Them; to revenge ſome Injury They have received; (which all Political Caſuiſts allow;) to aſſiſt ſome Ally in a juſt Quarrel; or laſtly, to defend Themſelves when They are Invaded. In all theſe Caſes, the Writers upon Politicks admit a War to be juſtly undertaken. The laſt is what hath been uſually called *pro aris & focis*; where no Expence or Endeavour can be too great, becauſe all we have is at ſtake, and conſequently, our utmoſt Force to be exerted; and the Diſpute is ſoon determined, either in Safety or utter Deſtruction. But in the other four, I believe it will be found, that no Monarch or Commonwealth did ever engage beyond a certain Degree; never proceeding ſo far as to exhauſt the Strength and Subſtance of their Country by Anticipations and Loans, which in a few Years muſt put them in a worſe Condition than any they could reaſonably apprehend from thoſe Evils, for the preventing of which they firſt entred into the War: Becauſe this would be to run into real infallible Ruin, only in hopes to remove what might perhaps but appear ſo by a probable Speculation.

And, as a War ſhould be undertaken upon a juſt and prudent Motive, ſo it is ſtill more obvious, that a Prince ought maturely to conſider the Condition he is in when he enters on it; Whether his Coffers be full, his Revenues clear of Debts, his People numerous and rich by a long Peace and free Trade, not overpreſſed with many burthenſome Taxes; No violent Faction ready to diſpute his juſt Prerogative, and thereby weaken his Authority at home, and leſſen his Reputation abroad. For, if the contrary of all this happen to be his Caſe, he will hardly be perſuaded to diſturb the World's Quiet and his own, while there is any other way left of preſerving the latter with Honour and Safety.

Suppoſing the War to have commenced upon a juſt Motive; the next Thing to be conſider'd is, When a Prince ought, in Prudence, to receive the Overtures of a Peace: Which I take to be, either when the Enemy is ready to yield the Point originally contended for, or when that Point is found impoſſible to

be ever obtained; or when contending any longer, though with Probability of gaining that Point at laſt, would put ſuch a Prince and his People in a worſe Condition than the preſent Loſs of it. All which Conſiderations are of much greater Force, where a War is managed by an Alliance of many Confederates, which in the variety of Intereſts, among the ſeveral Parties, is liable to ſo many unforeſeen Accidents.

In a Confederate War it ought to be conſidered, which Party has the deepeſt Share in the Quarrel: For though each may have their particular Reaſons, yet one or two among them will probably be more concerned than the reſt, and therefore ought to bear the greateſt part of the Burden, in proportion to their Strength. For Example: Two Princes may be Competitors for a Kingdom, and it will be your Intereſt to take the part of him who will probably allow you good Conditions of Trade, rather than of the other, who poſſibly may not. However, that Prince whoſe Cauſe you eſpouſe, though never ſo vigorouſly, is the Principal in that War, and You, properly ſpeaking, are but a Second. Or a Commonwealth may lie in danger to be overrun by a powerful Neighbour, which, in time, may produce very bad Conſequences upon your Trade and Liberty: 'Tis therefore neceſſary, as well as prudent, to lend them Aſſiſtance, and help them to win a ſtrong ſecure Frontier: but, as They muſt in courſe be the firſt and greateſt Sufferers, ſo in Juſtice, they ought to bear the greateſt Weight. If a Houſe be on Fire, it behoves all in the Neighbourhood to run with Buckets to quench it; but the Owner is ſure to be undone firſt; and it is not impoſſible that thoſe at next Door may eſcape, by a Shower from Heaven, or the Stillneſs of the Weather, or ſome other favourable Accident.

But, if an Ally, who is not ſo immediately concerned in the good or ill Fortune of the War, be ſo generous, as to contribute more than the Principal Party, and even more in proportion to his Abilities, he ought at leaſt to have his Share in what is conquered from the Enemy: Or, if his Romantick Diſpoſition tranſports him ſo far, as to expect little or nothing of this, he might however hope, that the Principals would make it up in Dignity and Reſpect; and he would ſurely think it monſtrous to find them intermeddling in his Domeſtick Affairs, preſcribing what Servants he ſhould keep or diſmiſs, preſſing him perpetually with the moſt unreaſonable Demands, and at every turn threatning to break the Alliance, if he will not comply.

From theſe Reflections upon War in general, I deſcend to conſider thoſe Wars, wherein *England* hath been engaged ſince the Conqueſt. In the Civil-Wars of the *Barons*, as well as thoſe between the Houſes of *York* and *Lancaſter*, great De-

ſtruction was made of the Nobility and Gentry, new Families raiſed, and old ones extinguiſhed, but the Money ſpent on both ſides was employed and circulated at Home; no Publick Debts contracted; and a very few Years of Peace quickly ſet all right again.

The like may be affirmed even of that unnatural Rebellion againſt King *Charles* I. the Uſurpers maintained great Armies in conſtant Pay, had almoſt continual War with *Spain* or *Holland*, but managing it by their Fleets, they encreaſed very much the Riches of the Kingdom, inſtead of exhauſting them.

Our Foreign Wars were generally againſt *Scotland* or *France*; the firſt being upon our own Continent, carried no Money out of the Kingdom, and were ſeldom of long continuance. During our firſt Wars with *France*, we poſſeſſed great Dominions in that Country, where we preſerved ſome Footing, till the Reign of Queen *Mary*; and though ſome of our latter Princes made very chargeable Expeditions thither, a Subſidy, and two or three Fifteenths, cleared all the Debt. Beſide, our Victories were then of ſome Uſe as well as Glory; for we were ſo prudent to Fight, and ſo happy to Conquer, only for ourſelves.

The *Dutch* Wars, in the Reign of King *Charles* II. though begun and carried on under a very corrupt Adminiſtration, and much to the Diſhonour of the Crown, did indeed keep the King needy and poor, by diſcontinuing or diſcontenting his Parliament, when he moſt needed their Aſſiſtance; but neither left any Debt upon the Nation, nor carried any Money out of it.

At the *Revolution*, a general War broke out in *Europe*, wherein many Princes joined in an Alliance againſt *France*, to check the ambitious Deſigns of that Monarch; and here the *Emperor*, the *Dutch*, and *England*, were Principals. About this time the Cuſtom firſt began among us of borrowing Millions upon Funds of Intereſt: It was pretended, that the War could not poſſibly laſt above one or two Campaigns; and that the Debts contracted might be eaſily paid in a few Years by a gentle Tax, without burdening the Subject. But the true Reaſon for embracing this Expedient, was the Security of a new Prince, not firmly ſettled on the Throne: People were tempted to lend, by great Premiums and large Intereſt, and it concerned them nearly to preſerve that Government, which they truſted with their Money. The Perſon ſaid to have been Author of ſo deteſtable a Project, is ſtill living, and lives to ſee ſome of its fatal Conſequences, whereof his Grand-Children will not ſee an end. And this pernicious Counſel cloſed very well with the Poſture of Affairs at that time: For, a Set of Upſtarts, who had little or no part in the *Revolution*, but va-

lued

lued themſelves by their Noiſe and pretended Zeal, when the Work was over, were got into Credit at Court, by the Merit of becoming Undertakers and Projectors of Loans and Funds: Theſe, finding that the Gentlemen of Eſtates were not willing to come into their Meaſures, fell upon thoſe new Schemes of raiſing Money, in order to create a Monied-Intereſt, that might in time vie with the Landed, and of which they hoped to be at the Head.

The Ground of the firſt War, for ten Years after the *Revolution*, as to the Part we had in it, was, to make *France* acknowledge the late King, and to recover *Hudſon's-Bay*. But during that whole War, the Sea was almoſt entirely neglected, and the greateſt part of *Six* Millions Annually employed to Enlarge the Frontier of the *Dutch*. For the King was a General, but not an Admiral; and although King of *England*, was a Native of *Holland*.

After ten Years Fighting to little Purpoſe; after the Loſs of above an hundred thouſand Men, and a Debt remaining of twenty Millions, we at length hearkened to the Terms of a Peace, which was concluded with great Advantages to the *Empire* and *Holland*, but none at all to us; and clogged ſoon after by the famous Treaty of *Partition*; by which *Naples*, *Sicily*, and *Lorrain*, were to be added to the *French* Dominions; or if that Crown ſhould think fit to ſet aſide the Treaty, upon the *Spaniards* refuſing to accept it, as they declared they would, to the ſeveral Parties at the very time of Tranſacting it; then the *French* would have Pretenſions to the whole Monarchy. And ſo it proved in the Event; for, the late King of *Spain* reckoning it an Indignity to have his Territories cantoned out into Parcels, by other Princes, during his own Life, and without his Conſent, rather choſe to bequeath the Monarchy entire to a younger Son of *France*: And this Prince was acknowledged for King of *Spain*, both by Us and *Holland*.

It muſt be granted, that the Counſels of entring into the preſent War were violently oppoſed by the *Church-Party*, who firſt adviſed the late King to Acknowledge the Duke of *Anjou*; and particularly, it is affirmed, that the Earl of *Godolphin*, who was then in the Church-Intereſt, told the King in *November*, 1701, That ſince his Majeſty was determined to engage in a War, ſo contrary to his private Opinion, he could ſerve him no longer, and accordingly gave up his Employment; though he happened afterwards to change his Mind, when he was to be Lord High Treaſurer, and have the ſole Management of Affairs at Home; while thoſe Abroad were to be in the Hands of *One*, whoſe Advantage, by all ſorts of Ties, he was engaged to promote.

The Declarations of War againſt *France* and *Spain*, made by Us and *Holland*, are dated within a few Days of each other. In that publiſhed by the *States*, they ſay very truly, That *they are neareſt, and moſt expoſed to the Fire*; that *they are blocked up on all ſides, and actually attacked by the Kings of* France *and* Spain; that *their Declaration is the Effect of an urgent and preſſing Neceſſity*; with other Expreſſions to the ſame purpoſe. They *deſire the Aſſiſtance of all Kings and Princes*, &c. The grounds of their Quarrel with *France*, are ſuch as only affect themſelves, or at leaſt more immediately than any other Prince or State; ſuch as, *the* French *refuſing to grant the Tariff promiſed by the Treaty of* Ryſwick; *the loading the* Dutch *Inhabitants ſettled in* France, *with exceſſive Duties, contrary to the ſaid Treaty; the Violation of the* Partition-Treaty, *by the* French *accepting the King of* Spain's *Will, and threatning the* States, *if they would not comply; the ſeizing the* Spaniſh Netherlands *by the* French *Troops, and turning out the* Dutch, *who by Permiſſion of the late King of* Spain *were in Garriſon there; by which means that Republick was deprived of her Barrier, contrary to the Treaty of* Partition, *where it was particularly ſtipulated, that the* Spaniſh Netherlands *ſhould be left to the Archduke.* They alledged, that *the* French *King governed* Flanders *as his own, tho' under the Name of his Grandſon, and ſent great Numbers of Troops thither to fright them: That he had ſeized the City and Citadel of* Liege, *had poſſeſſed himſelf of ſeveral Places in the Archbiſhoprick of* Cologn, *and maintained Troops in the Country of* Wolfenbuttle, *in order to block up the* Dutch *on all ſides; and cauſed his Reſident to give in a Memorial, wherein he threatned the* States *to act againſt them, if they refuſed complying with the Contents of that Memorial.*

The Queen's Declaration of War is grounded upon the *Grand Alliance*, as This was upon the unjuſt Uſurpations and Encroachments of the *French* King; whereof the Inſtances produced are, *His keeping in Poſſeſſion a great Part of the* Spaniſh *Dominions, ſeizing* Milan *and the* Spaniſh *Low Countries, making himſelf Maſter of* Cadiz, &c. *And inſtead of giving Satisfaction in theſe Points, his putting an Indignity and Affront on Her Majeſty and Kingdoms, by Declaring the Pretended Prince of* Wales *King of* England, *&c.* which laſt was the only perſonal Quarrel we had in the War; and even this was poſitively denied by *France*, that King being then willing to Acknowledge Her Majeſty.

I think it plainly appears by both Declarations, that *England* ought no more to have been a Principal in this War, than *Pruſſia*, or any other Power, who came afterwards into that Alliance. *Holland* was firſt in Danger, the *French* Troops being

ing at that time juſt at the Gates of *Nimeguen*. But the Complaints made in our Declaration, do all, except the laſt, as much or more concern almoſt every Prince in *Europe*.

For, among the ſeveral Parties who came firſt or laſt into this Confederacy, there were few but who, in proportion, had more to get or loſe, to hope or to fear, from the good or ill Succeſs of this War, than We. The *Dutch* took up Arms to defend themſelves from immediate Ruin; and by a ſucceſsful War, they propoſed to have a larger Extent of Country, and a better Frontier againſt *France*. The *Emperor* hoped to recover the Monarchy of *Spain*, or ſome Part of it, for his younger Son, chiefly at the Expence of Us and *Holland*. The King of *Portugal* had received intelligence, that *Philip* deſigned to renew the old Pretenſions of *Spain* upon that Kingdom, which is ſurrounded by the other on all Sides, except towards the Sea, and could therefore only be defended by *Maritime Powers*. This, with the advantageous Terms offered by King *Charles*, as well as by us, prevailed with that Prince to enter into the Alliance. The Duke of *Savoy*'s Temptations and Fears were yet greater: The main Charge of the War on that Side, was to be ſupplied by *England*, and the Profit to redound to him. In caſe *Milan* ſhould be Conquered, it was ſtipulated that his Royal Highneſs ſhould have the Dutchy of *Montferrat*, belonging to the Duke of *Mantua*, the Provinces of *Alexandria*, and *Valentia*, and *Lomellino*, with other Lands between the *Po* and the *Tanaro*, together with the *Vigevenaſco*, or, in lieu of it, an Equivalent out of the Province of *Novara*, adjoining to his own State; beſide whatever elſe could be taken from *France* on that Side by the Confederate Forces. Then, he was in terrible Apprehenſions of being ſurrounded by *France*, who had ſo many Troops in the *Milaneſe*, and might have eaſily ſwallowed up his whole Dutchy.

The reſt of the Allies came in purely for Subſidies, whereof they ſunk conſiderable Sums into their own Coffers, and refuſed to ſend their *Contingent* to the *Emperor*, alledging their Troops were already hired by *England* and *Holland*.

Some time after the Duke of *Anjou*'s ſucceeding to the Monarchy of *Spain*, in breach of the Partition-Treaty, the Queſtion here in *England* was, Whether the Peace ſhould be continued, or a new War begun. Thoſe who were for the former, alledged the Debts and Difficulties we laboured under; that both We and the *Dutch* had already acknowledged *Philip* for King of *Spain*; that the Inclinations of the *Spaniards* to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and their Averſion for that of *Bourbon*, were not ſo ſurely to be reckoned upon, as ſome would pretend; that We rightly thought it a Piece of Inſolence, as well as Injuſtice,

in the *French*, to offer putting a King upon Us; and the *Spaniards* would conceive, we had as little Reaſon to force one upon Them; that it was true, the Nature and Genius of thoſe two People differed very much, and ſo would probably continue to do, as well under a King of *French* Blood, as one of *Auſtrian*; but, if we ſhould engage in a War for Dethroning the Duke of *Anjou*, we ſhould certainly effect what, by the Progreſs and Operations of it, we endeavoured to prevent, I mean an Union of Intereſt and Affections between the two Nations; for the *Spaniards* muſt of neceſſity call in *French* Troops to their Aſſiſtance: This would introduce *French* Counſellors into King *Philip*'s Court; and this by degrees, would habituate and reconcile the two Nations: That, to aſſiſt King *Charles* by *Engliſh* or *Dutch* Forces, would render him odious to his new Subjects, who have nothing in ſo great an Abomination, as thoſe whom they hold for *Hereticks*: That, the *French* would by this means become Maſters of the Treaſures in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*: That in the laſt War, when *Spain*, *Cologn* and *Bavaria* were in our Alliance, and by a modeſt Computation brought ſixty thouſand Men into the Field againſt the common Enemy; when *Flanders*, the Seat of War, was on our Side, and his Majeſty, a Prince of great Valour and Conduct, at the Head of the whole Confederate Army; yet we had no Reaſon to boaſt of our Succeſs: How then ſhould we be able to oppoſe *France* with thoſe Powers againſt us, which would carry ſixty thouſand Men from us to the Enemy, and ſo make us, upon the Balance, weaker by one hundred and twenty thouſand Men, at the Beginning of this War, than of that in the Year 1688?

On the other Side, thoſe whoſe Opinion, or ſome private Motives, inclined them to give their Advice for entering into a new War, alledged how dangerous it would be for *England*, that *Philip* ſhould be King of *Spain*; that we could have no Security for our Trade, while that Kingdom was ſubject to a Prince of the *Bourbon* Family; nor any Hopes of preſerving the Balance of *Europe*, becauſe the Grand-father would, in effect, be King, while the Grandſon had but the Title, and thereby have a better Opportunity than ever of purſuing his Deſign for Univerſal Monarchy. Theſe and the like Arguments prevailed; and ſo, without offering any other Remedy, without taking time to conſider the Conſequences, or to reflect on our Condition, we haſtily engaged in a War which had coſt us ſixty Millions; and after repeated, as well as unexpected Succeſs in Arms, hath put us and our Poſterity in a worſe Condition, not only than any of our Allies, but even our conquered Enemies themſelves.

The

The Part we have acted in the Conduct of this whole War, with reference to our Allies abroad, and to a prevailing Faction at home, is what I ſhall now particularly examine; where I preſume it will appear, by plain Matters of Fact, that no Nation was ever ſo long or ſo ſcandalouſly abuſed by the Folly, the Temerity, the Corruption, the Ambition of its domeſtick Enemies; or treated with ſo much Inſolence, Injuſtice and Ingratitude by its foreign Friends.

This will be manifeſt by proving the three following Points.

Firſt, That againſt all manner of Prudence or common Reaſon, we engaged in this War as Principals, when we ought to have acted only as Auxiliaries.

Secondly, That we ſpent all our Vigour in purſuing that Part of the War which could leaſt anſwer the End we propoſed by beginning of it; and made no Efforts at all where we could have moſt weakened the common Enemy, and at the ſame time enriched ourſelves.

Laſtly, That we ſuffered each of our Allies to break every Article in thoſe Treaties and Agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the Burden upon us.

Upon the firſt of theſe Points, That we ought to have entered into this War only as Auxiliaries. Let any Man reflect upon our Condition at that Time; Juſt come out of the moſt tedious, expenſive and unſucceſsful War that ever *England* had been engaged in; ſinking under heavy Debts, of a Nature and Degree never heard of by us or our Anceſtors; the Bulk of the Gentry and People heartily tired of the War, and glad of a Peace though it brought no other Advantage but itſelf: No ſudden Proſpect of leſſening our Taxes, which were grown as neceſſary to pay our Debts, as to raiſe Armies: A ſort of artificial Wealth of Funds and Stocks in the Hands of thoſe who for ten Years before had been plundering the Publick; many Corruptions in every Branch of our Government, that needed Reformation. Under theſe Difficulties, from which twenty Years Peace, and the wiſeſt Management, could hardly recover us, we declare War againſt *France*, fortified by the Acceſſion and Alliance of thoſe Powers I mentioned before, and which, in the former War, had been Parties in our Confederacy. It is very obvious what a Change muſt be made in the Balance, by ſuch Weights taken out of our Scale and put into theirs; ſince it was manifeſt by ten Years Experience, that *France*, without thoſe Additions of Strength, was able to maintain itſelf againſt us. So that human Probability ran with mighty odds on the other Side; and in that caſe, nothing under the moſt extreme

Neceſſity

Neceſſity ſhould force any State to engage in a War. We had already acknowledged *Philip* for King of *Spain*; neither does the Queen's Declaration of War take notice of the Duke of *Anjou*'s Succeſſion to that Monarchy, as a Subject of Quarrel; but the *French* King's governing it as if it were his own; his ſeizing *Cadiz*, *Milan*, and the *Spaniſh Low Countries*, with the Indignity of proclaiming the *Pretender*. In all which we charge that Prince with nothing directly relating to us, excepting the laſt: And this, although indeed a great Affront, might have eaſily been redreſſed without a War; for the *French* Court declared they did not acknowledge the *Pretender*, but only gave him the Title of *King*, which was allowed to *Auguſtus* by his Enemy of *Sweden*, who had driven him out of *Poland*, and forced him to acknowledge *Staniſlaus*.

'Tis true indeed, the Danger of the *Dutch*, by ſo ill a Neighbourhood in *Flanders*, might affect us very much in the Conſequences of it; and the Loſs of *Spain* to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, if it ſhould be governed by *French* Influence, and *French* Politicks, might, in time, be very pernicious to our Trade. It would therefore have been prudent, as well as generous and charitable, to help our Neighbour; and ſo we might have done without injuring ourſelves: For by an old Treaty with *Holland*, we were bound to aſſiſt that Republick with ten thouſand Men, whenever they were attacked by the *French*; whoſe Troops, upon the King of *Spain*'s Death, taking Poſſeſſion of *Flanders*, in right of *Philip*, and ſecuring the *Dutch* Garriſons till they would acknowledge him, the *States General*, by Memorials from their Envoy here, demanded only the ten thouſand Men, we were obliged to give by virtue of that Treaty. And I make no doubt but *Holland* would have exerted themſelves ſo vigorouſly, as to be able, with that aſſiſtance alone, to defend their Frontiers: Or, if they had been forced to a Peace, the *Spaniards*, who abhor diſmembering their Monarchy, would never have ſuffered the *French* to poſſeſs themſelves of *Flanders*. At that time they had none of thoſe Endearments to each other which this War hath created; and whatever Hatred and Jealouſy were natural between the two Nations, would then have appeared. So that there was no ſort of Neceſſity for us to proceed further, although we had been in a better Condition. But our Politicians, at that time, had other Views, and a new War muſt be undertaken, upon the Advice of thoſe who, with their Partizans and Adherents, were to be the ſole Gainers by it. A grand Alliance was therefore made between the Emperor, *England*, and the *States-General*; by which, if the Injuries complained of from *France* were not remedied in two Months, the

Parties

Parties concerned were obliged mutually to aſſiſt each other *with their whole Strength.*

Thus we became Principal in a War, in Conjunction with two Allies, whoſe Share in the Quarrel was, beyond all Proportion, greater than ours. However, I can ſee no Reaſon from the Words of the Grand Alliance, by which we were obliged to make thoſe prodigious Expences we have ſince been at. By what I have always heard and read, I take the *whole Strength of the Nation*, as underſtood in that Treaty, to be the utmoſt that a Prince can raiſe annually from his Subjects; if he be forced to mortgage and borrow, whether at home or abroad, it is not, properly ſpeaking, *his own Strength*, or that of the Nation, but the entire Subſtance of particular Perſons, which not being able to raiſe out of the annual Income of his Kingdom, he takes upon Security, and can only pay the Intereſt; and by this Method one Part of the Nation is pawned to the other, with hardly a Poſſibility left of being ever redeemed.

Surely it would have been enough for us to have ſuſpended the Payment of our Debts contracted in the former War, to have continued our Land and Malt Tax, with thoſe others which have ſince been mortgaged: Theſe, with ſome Additions, would have made up ſuch a Sum, as, with prudent Management, might, I ſuppoſe, have maintained an hundred thouſand Men by Sea and Land; a reaſonable Quota in all Conſcience for that Ally, who apprehended leaſt Danger, and expected leaſt Advantage. Nor can we imagine that either of the Confederates, when the War begun, would have been ſo unreaſonable, as to refuſe joining with us upon ſuch a Foot, and expect that we ſhould every Year go between three and four Millions in Debt, (which hath been our Caſe) becauſe the *French* could hardly have contrived any Offers of a Peace ſo ruinous to us as ſuch a War. Poſterity will be at a loſs to conceive what kind of Spirit could poſſeſs their Anceſtors, who after ten Years Suffering, by the unexampled Politicks of a Nation, maintaining a War by annually pawning itſelf; and during a ſhort Peace, while they were looking back with Horror on the heavy Load of Debts they had contracted, univerſally condemning thoſe pernicious Counſels which had occaſioned them; racking their Invention for ſome Remedies or Expedients to mend their ſhattered Condition: That theſe very People, without giving themſelves time to breathe, ſhould again enter into a more dangerous, chargeable, and extenſive War, for the ſame, or perhaps a greater Period of Time, and without any apparent Neceſſity. It is obvious in a private Fortune, that whoever annually runs out, and continues the ſame Expences, muſt every Year mortgage a greater Quantity of Land than he

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did before; and as the Debt doubles and trebles upon him, ſo doth his Inability to pay it. By the ſame Proportion we have ſuffered twice as much by this laſt ten Years War, as we did by the former; and if it were poſſible to continue it five Years longer at the ſame rate, it would be as great a Burden as the whole twenty. This Computation, ſo eaſy and trivial as it is almoſt a Shame to mention, Poſterity will think that thoſe who firſt adviſed the War, had either not the Senſe or the Honeſty to conſider.

And as we have waſted our Strength and vital Subſtance in this profuſe manner, ſo we have ſhamefully miſapplied it to Ends at leaſt very different from thoſe for which we undertook the War, and often to effect others which after a Peace we may ſeverely repent. This is the ſecond Article I propoſed to examine.

WE have now for ten Years together turned the whole Force and Expence of the War, where the Enemy was beſt able to hold us at a Bay; where we could propoſe no manner of Advantage to ourſelves; where it was highly impolitick to enlarge our Conqueſts; utterly neglecting that Part which would have ſaved and gained us many Millions, which the perpetual Maxims of our Government teach us to purſue; which would have ſooneſt weakened the Enemy, and muſt either have promoted a ſpeedy Peace, or enabled us to go on with the War.

Thoſe who are fond of continuing the War, cry up our conſtant Succeſs at a moſt prodigious rate, and reckon it infinitely greater than in all human Probability we had reaſon to hope. Ten glorious Campaigns are paſſed, and now at laſt, like the ſick Man, we are juſt expiring with all ſorts of good Symptoms. Did the Adviſers of this War ſuppoſe, it would continue ten Years, without expecting the Succeſſes we have had; and yet at the ſame time determine, that *France* muſt be reduced, and *Spain* ſubdued, by employing our whole Strength upon *Flanders?* Did they believe the laſt War left us in a Condition to furniſh ſuch vaſt Supplies for ſo long a Period, without involving us and our Poſterity in unextricable Debts? If after ſuch miraculous *Doings*, we are not yet in a Condition of bringing *France* to our Terms, nor can tell when we ſhall be ſo, though we ſhould proceed without any Reverſe of Fortune; what could we look for in the ordinary Courſe of Things, but a *Flanders* War of at leaſt twenty Years longer? Do they indeed think a Town taken for the *Dutch*, is a ſufficient Recompence to us for ſix Millions of Money? which is of ſo little Conſequence to the determining the War, that the *French* may yet hold out a dozen Years more, and afford a Town every Campaign at the ſame Price.

I ſay not this, by any means, to detract from the Army or

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its Leaders. Getting into the Enemies Lines, paſſing Rivers, and taking Towns, may be Actions attended with many glorious Circumſtances: But when all this brings no real ſolid Advantage to us, when it hath no other End than to enlarge the Territories of the *Dutch*, and increaſe the Fame and Wealth of our *C——l*, I conclude, however it comes about, that Things are not as they ſhould be; and that ſurely our Forces and Money might be better employed, both towards reducing our Enemy, and working ſome Benefit to ourſelves. But the Caſe is ſtill much harder, we are deſtroying many thouſand Lives, exhauſting all our Subſtance, not for our own Intereſt, which would be but common Prudence; not for a Thing indifferent, which would be ſufficient Folly; but perhaps to our own Deſtruction, which is perfect Madneſs. We may live to feel the Effects of our Valour more ſenſibly than all the Conſequences we imagine from the Dominions of *Spain* in the Duke of *Anjou*. We have conquered a noble Territory for the *States*, that will maintain ſufficient Troops to defend itſelf, feed many hundred thouſand Inhabitants, where all Encouragement will be given to introduce and improve Manufactures, which was the only Advantage they wanted; and which, added to their Skill, Induſtry, and Parſimony, will enable them to underſell us in every Market of the World.

Our Supply of forty thouſand Men, according to the firſt Stipulation, added to the Quota's of the Emperor and *Holland*, which they were obliged to furniſh, would have made an Army of near Two hundred thouſand, excluſive of Garriſons; enough to withſtand all the Power that *France* could bring againſt it; and we might have employed the reſt much better, both for the common Cauſe and our Advantage.

The War in *Spain* muſt be imputed to the Credulity of our Miniſters, who ſuffered themſelves to be perſuaded by the Imperial Court, that the *Spaniards* were ſo violently affected to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, as upon the firſt Appearance there, with a few Troops under the Archduke, the whole Kingdom would immediately revolt. This we tried, and found the Emperor to have deceived either us or himſelf: Yet there we drove on the War at a prodigious Diſadvantage, with great Expence; and by a moſt corrupt Management, the only General, who by a Courſe of Conduct and Fortune almoſt miraculous, had nearly put us into Poſſeſſion of the Kingdom, was left wholly unſupported, expoſed to the Envy of his Rivals, diſappointed by the Caprices of a young unexperienced Prince, under the Guidance of a rapacious *German* Miniſtry, and at laſt called home in Diſcontent: By which our Armies, both in *Spain* and *Portugal*, were made a Sacrifice to Avarice, Ill-conduct or Treachery.

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In common Prudence, we ſhould either have puſhed that War with the utmoſt Vigour, in ſo fortunate a Juncture, eſpecially ſince the gaining that Kingdom was the great Point for which we pretended to continue the War, or at leaſt when we had *found* or *made* that Deſign impracticable, we ſhould not have gone on in ſo expenſive a Management of it; but have kept our Troops on the Defenſive in *Catalonia*, and purſued ſome other way more effectual for diſtreſſing the common Enemy, and advantaging Ourſelves.

And what a noble Field of Honour and Profit had we before us, wherein to employ the beſt of our Strength, which againſt all the Maxims of *Britiſh* Policy, we ſuffered to lie wholly neglected? I have ſometimes wondered how it came to paſs, that the Style of *Maritime Powers*, by which our Allies in a ſort of contemptuous Manner, uſually couple us with the *Dutch*, did never put us in Mind of the Sea; and while ſome Politicians were ſhewing us the way to *Spain* by *Flanders*, others by *Savoy* or *Naples*, that the *Weſt-Indies* ſhould never come into their Heads. With half the Charge we have been at, we might have maintained our original Quota of Forty thouſand Men in *Flanders*, and at the ſame Time by our Fleets and Naval Forces, have ſo diſtreſſed the *Spaniards* in the North and South Seas of *America*, as to prevent any Returns of Money from thence, except in our own Bottoms. This is what beſt became us to do as a *Maritime Power:* This, with any common Degree of Succeſs, would ſoon have compelled *France* to the Neceſſities of a Peace, and *Spain* to acknowledge the Arch-duke. But while We, for ten Years, have been ſquandering away our Money upon the Continent, *France* hath been wiſely engroſſing all the Trade of *Peru*, going directly with their Ships to *Lima*, and other Ports, and there receiving Ingots of Gold and Silver for *French* Goods of little Value; which, beſides the mighty Advantage to their Nation at preſent, may divert the Channel of that Trade for the future, ſo beneficial to us, who uſed to receive annually ſuch vaſt Sums at *Cadiz*, for our Goods ſent thence to the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*. All this we tamely ſaw and ſuffered, without the leaſt Attempt to hinder it; except what was performed by ſome private Men at *Briſtol*, who, inflamed by a true Spirit of Courage and Induſtry, did, about three Years ago, with a few Veſſels, fitted out at their own Charge, make a moſt ſucceſsful Voyage into thoſe Parts, took one of the *Aquapulco* Ships, very narrowly miſt of the other, and are lately returned laden with unenvied Wealth; to ſhew us what might have been done with the like Management, by a publick Undertaking. At leaſt we might eaſily have prevented thoſe great Returns of Money

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to *France* and *Spain*, though we could not have taken it ourſelves.

And if it be true, as the Advocates for War would have it, that the *French* are now ſo impoveriſhed; in what condition muſt they have been, if that Iſſue of Wealth had been ſtopped?

But great Events often turn upon very ſmall Circumſtances. It was the Kingdom's Misfortune, that the Sea was not the D—— of *M*———*h*'s Element, otherwiſe the whole Force of the War would infallibly have been beſtowed there, infinitely to the Advantage of his Country, which would then have gone hand in hand with his own. But it is very truly objected, That if we alone had made ſuch an Attempt as this, *Holland* would have been jealous; or if we had done it in conjunction with *Holland*, the Houſe of *Auſtria* would have been diſcontented. This hath been the Style of late Years; which whoever introduced among us, they have taught our Allies to ſpeak after them. Otherwiſe it could hardly enter into any Imagination, that while we are Confederates in a War, with thoſe who are to have the whole Profit, and who leave a double Share of the Burden upon us, we dare not think of any Deſign, though againſt the common Enemy, where there is the leaſt Proſpect of doing Good to our own Country, for fear of giving Umbrage and Offence to our Allies; while we are ruining ourſelves to conquer Provinces and Kingdoms for them. I therefore confeſs with Shame, that this Objection is true: For it is very well known, that while the Deſign of Mr. *Hill*'s Expedition remained a Secret, it was ſuſpected in *Holland* and *Germany* to be intended againſt *Peru*; whereupon the *Dutch* made every where their publick Complaints, and the Miniſters at *Vienna* talked of it *as an Inſolence in the Qu---n to attempt ſuch an Undertaking*; which, however it has failed, partly by the Accidents of a Storm, and partly by the Stubbornneſs or Treachery of ſome in that Colony, for whoſe Relief, and at whoſe Entreaty it was, in ſome meaſure, deſigned, is no Objection at all to an Enterprize ſo well concerted, and with ſuch fair Probability of Succeſs.

It was ſomething ſingular that the *States* ſhould expreſs their Uneaſineſs, when they thought we intended to make ſome Attempt in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*; becauſe it is agreed between us, that whatever is conquered there, by us or them, ſhall belong to the Conqueror: Which is the only Article that I can call to mind, in all our Treaties or Stipulations, with any View of Intereſt to this Kingdom; and for that very Reaſon, I ſuppoſe, among others, hath been altogether neglected. Let thoſe who think this too ſevere a Reflection, examine the whole Management of the preſent War by Sea and Land with all our Alliances, Treaties, Stipulations and Conventions, and conſider,

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whether the whole does not look as if ſome particular Care and Induſtry had been uſed, to prevent any Benefit or Advantage that might poſſibly accrue to *Britain*.

This kind of Treatment from our two principal Allies, hath taught the ſame Dialect to all the reſt; ſo that there is hardly a petty Prince, whom we half maintained by Subſidies and Penſions, who is not ready, upon every Occaſion, to threaten us, that he will recal his Troops (though they muſt rob or ſtarve at home) if we refuſe to comply with him in any Demand, however ſo unreaſonable.

UPON the third Head I ſhall produce ſome Inſtances, to ſhew how tamely we have ſuffered each of our Allies to infringe every Article in thoſe Treaties and Stipulations by which they are bound, and to lay the Load upon us.

But before I enter upon this, which is a large Subject, I ſhall take leave to offer a few Remarks on certain Articles in three of our Treaties; which may let us perceive how much thoſe Miniſters valued or underſtood the true Intereſt, Safety, or Honour of their Country.

We have made two Alliances with *Portugal*, an offenſive and defenſive: The firſt is to remain in force only during the preſent War; the ſecond to be perpetual. In the Offenſive Alliance, the Emperor, *England*, and *Holland* are Parties with *Portugal*; in the Defenſive only we and the *States*.

Upon the firſt Article of the offenſive Alliance it is to be obſerved, that although the Grand Alliance, as I have already ſaid, allows *England* and *Holland* to poſſeſs for their own, whatever each of them ſhall conquer in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*; yet here we are quite cut out, by conſenting, that the Archduke ſhall poſſeſs the Dominions of *Spain* in as full a manner as their late King *Charles*. And what is more remarkable, we broke this very Article in favour of *Portugal*, by ſubſequent Stipulations; where we agree, that King *Charles* ſhall deliver up *Eſtramadura*, *Vigo*, and ſome other Places, to the *Portugueſe*, as ſoon as we can conquer them from the Enemy. They who are guilty of ſo much Folly and Contradiction, know beſt whether it proceeded from Corruption or Stupidity.

By two other Articles (beſides the Honour of being Convoys and Guards in ordinary to the *Portugueſe* Ships and Coaſts) we are to gueſs the Enemies Thoughts, and to take the King of *Portugal*'s Word, whenever he has a Fancy that he ſhall be invaded: We alſo are to furniſh him with a Strength ſuperior to what the Enemy intends to invade any of his Dominions with, let that be what it will: And, till we know what the Enemies Forces are, his *Portugueſe* Majeſty is ſole Judge what Strength is ſuperior, and what will be able to prevent an Invaſion; and

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may ſend our Fleets, whenever he pleaſes, upon his Errands, to ſome of the fartheſt Parts of the World, or keep them attending upon his own Coaſts, till he thinks fit to diſmiſs them. Theſe Fleets muſt likewiſe be ſubject in all things, not only to the King but to his Viceroys, Admirals and Governors, in any of his foreign Dominions, when he is in a Humour to apprehend an Invaſion; which, I believe, is an Indignity that was never offered before, except to a conquered Nation.

In the Defenſive Alliance with that Crown, which is to remain perpetual, and where only *England* and *Holland* are Parties with them, the ſame Care, in almoſt the ſame Words, is taken for our Fleet to attend their Coaſts and foreign Dominions, and to be under the ſame Obedience. We and the *States* are likewiſe to furniſh them with twelve thouſand Men at our own Charge, which we are conſtantly to recruit, and theſe are to be ſubject to the *Portugueſe* Generals.

In the Offenſive Alliance we took no care of having the Aſſiſtance of *Portugal*, whenever we ſhould be invaded: But in this, it ſeems, we were wiſer; for that King is obliged to make War on *France* or *Spain*, whenever we or *Holland* are invaded by either; but before this, we are to ſupply them with the ſame Forces, both by Sea and Land, as if he were invaded himſelf; and this muſt needs be a very prudent and ſafe Courſe for a Maritime Power to take upon a ſudden Invaſion; by which, inſtead of making uſe of our Fleets and Armies for our own Defence, we muſt ſend them abroad for the Defence of *Portugal*.

By the thirteenth Article we are told, what this Aſſiſtance is which the *Portugueſe* are to give us, and upon what Conditions. They are to furniſh ten Men of War; and when *England* or *Holland* ſhall be invaded by *France* and *Spain* together, or by *Spain* alone; in either of theſe Caſes, thoſe ten *Portugueſe* Men of War are to ſerve only upon their own Coaſts; where, no doubt, they will be of mighty Uſe to their Allies, and Terror to the Enemy.

How the *Dutch* were drawn to have a Part in either of theſe two Alliances, is not very material to enquire, ſince they have been ſo wiſe as never to obſerve them, nor, I ſuppoſe, ever intended it, but reſolved, as they have ſince done, to ſhift the Load upon us.

Let any Man read theſe two Treaties from the Beginning to the End, he will imagine that the King of *Portugal* and his Miniſters ſat down and made them by themſelves, and then ſent them to their Allies to ſign; the whole Spirit and Tenor of them, quite through, running only upon this ſingle Point, what we and *Holland* are to do for *Portugal*, without any Mention

of an Equivalent, except thoſe ten Ships, which at the time when we have greateſt need of their Aſſiſtance, are obliged to attend upon their own Coaſts.

The Barrier-Treaty between *Great-Britain* and *Holland*, was concluded at the *Hague* on the 29th of *October*, in the Year 1709. In this Treaty, neither Her Majeſty, nor Her Kingdoms, have any Intereſt or Concern, farther than what is mentioned in the ſecond and the twentieth Articles: By the former, the States are to aſſiſt the Qu—n in defending the Act of Succeſſion; and by the other, not to treat of a Peace till *France* acknowledges the Qu—n, and the Succeſſion of *Hanover*, and promiſes to remove the *Pretender* out of his Dominions.

As to the firſt of theſe, It is certainly for the Safety and Intereſt of the *States-General*, that the Proteſtant Succeſſion ſhould be preſerved in *England*; becauſe ſuch a Popiſh Prince as we apprehend, would infallibly join with *France* in the Ruin of that Republick. And the *Dutch* are as much bound to ſupport our Succeſſion, as they are tied to any Part of a Treaty of League offenſive and defenſive, againſt a common Enemy, without any ſeparate Benefit upon that Conſideration. Her Majeſty is in the full peaceable Poſſeſſion of Her Kingdoms, and of the Hearts of her People; among whom, hardly one in five hundred are in the *Pretender*'s Intereſt. And whether the Aſſiſtance of the *Dutch*, to preſerve a Right ſo well eſtabliſhed, be an Equivalent to thoſe many unreaſonable exorbitant Articles in the reſt of the Treaty, let the World judge. What an Impreſſion of our Settlement muſt it give abroad, to ſee our Miniſters offering ſuch Conditions to the *Dutch*, to prevail on them to be Guarantees of our Acts of Parliament! Neither perhaps is it right, in point of Policy or good Senſe, that a foreign Power ſhould be called in to confirm our Succeſſion by way of Guarantee; but only to acknowledge it. Otherwiſe we put it out of the Power of our own Legiſlature to change our Succeſſion, without the Conſent of that Prince or State who is Guarantee; however our Poſterity may hereafter, by the Tyranny and Oppreſſion of any ſucceeding Princeſs, be reduced to the fatal Neceſſity of breaking in upon the excellent and happy Settlement now in force.

As to the other Article, it is a natural Conſequence that muſt attend any Treaty of Peace we can make with *France*; being only the Acknowledgment of Her Majeſty as Queen of her own Dominions, and the Right of Succeſſion by our own Laws, which no foreign Power hath any Pretence to diſpute.

However, in order to deſerve theſe mighty Advantages from the *States*, the reſt of the Treaty is wholly taken up in directing what we are to do for them.

By the Grand Alliance, which was the Foundation of the preſent

ſent War, the *Spaniſh Low Countries* were to be recovered and delivered to the King of *Spain:* But by this Treaty, that Prince is to poſſeſs nothing in *Flanders* during the War: And after a Peace, the *States* are to have the military Command of about 20 Towns with their Dependances, and four hundred thouſand Crowns a Year from the King of *Spain* to maintain their Garriſons. By which means they will have the Command of all *Flanders*, from *Newport* on the Sea to *Namur* on the *Maeſe*, and be entirely Maſters of the *Pais de Waas*, the richeſt Part of thoſe Provinces. Further, they have liberty to garriſon any Place they ſhall think fit in the *Spaniſh Low Countries*, whenever there is an Appearance of War; and conſequently to put Garriſons into *Oſtend*, or where elſe they pleaſe, upon a Rupture with *England*.

By this Treaty likewiſe, the *Dutch* will, in effect, be entire Maſters of all the *Low Countries*, may impoſe Duties, Reſtrictions in Commerce, and Prohibitions at their Pleaſure; and in that fertile Country may ſet up all ſorts of Manufactures, particularly the Woollen, by inviting the diſobliged Manufacturers in *Ireland*, and the *French* Refugees, who are ſcattered all over *Germany*. And as this Manufacture increaſes abroad, the Cloathing People of *England* will be neceſſitated, for want of Employment, to follow; and in few Years, by help of the low Intereſt of Money in *Holland*, *Flanders* may recover that beneficial Trade which we got from them: The Landed-men of *England* will then be forced to re-eſtabliſh the Staples of Wool abroad; and the *Dutch*, inſtead of being only the Carriers, will become the original Poſſeſſors of thoſe Commodities, with which the greateſt Part of the Trade of the World is now carried on. And as they increaſe their Trade it is obvious, they will enlarge their Strength at Sea, and that ours muſt leſſen in proportion.

All the Ports in *Flanders* are to be ſubject to the like Duties the *Dutch* ſhall lay upon the *Scheld*, which is to be cloſed on the Side of the *States:* Thus all other Nations are, in effect, ſhut out from Trading with *Flanders*. Yet in the very ſame Article it is ſaid, That the *States* ſhall be *favoured in all the* Spaniſh *Dominions as much as* Great-Britain, *or as the People moſt favoured*. We have conquered *Flanders* for them, and are in a worſe Condition, as to our Trade there, than before the War began. We have been the great Support of the King of *Spain*, to whom the *Dutch* have hardly contributed any thing at all; and yet *they are to be equally favoured with us in all his Dominions*. Of all this the Queen is under the unreaſonable Obligation of being Guarantee, and that they ſhall poſſeſs their Barrier, and their four hundred thouſand Crowns a Year, even before a Peace.

It is to be obſerved, that this Treaty was only ſigned by one of our Plenipotentiaries: And I have been told, that the other was heard to ſay, He would rather loſe his Right-hand, than ſet it to ſuch a Treaty. Had he ſpoke thoſe Words in due Seaſon, and loud enough to be heard on this Side of the Water, conſidering the Credit he had then at Court, he might have ſaved much of his Country's Honour, and got as much to himſelf: Therefore if the Report be true, I am inclined to think he only SAID it. I have been likewiſe told, that ſome very neceſſary Circumſtances were wanting in the Entrance upon this Treaty; but the Miniſters here rather choſe to ſacrifice the Honour of the Crown, and the Safety of their Country, than not ratify what one of their Favourites had tranſacted.

Let me now conſider in what manner our Allies have obſerved thoſe Treaties they made with us, and the ſeveral Stipulations and Agreements purſuant to them.

By the Grand Alliance between the Empire, *England* and *Holland*, we are to aſſiſt the other two, *totis viribus*, by Sea and Land. By a Convention ſubſequent to this Treaty, the Propoſitions which the ſeveral Parties ſhould contribute towards the War, were adjuſted in the following manner. The Emperor was obliged to furniſh ninety thouſand Men againſt *France*, either in *Italy*, or upon the *Rhine: Holland* to bring ſixty thouſand into the Field in *Flanders*, excluſive of Garriſons; and we forty thouſand. In Winter, 1702, which was the next Year, the Duke of *Marlborough* propoſed the raiſing of ten thouſand Men more, by way of Augmentation, and to carry on the War with greater Vigour; to which the Parliament agreed, and the *Dutch* were to raiſe the ſame Number. This was upon a *Par*, directly contrary to the former Stipulations, whereby our Part was to be a Third leſs than theirs; and therefore it was granted, with a Condition, that *Holland* ſhould break off all Trade and Commerce with *France*. But this Condition was never executed, the *Dutch* only amuſing us with a ſpecious Declaration till our Seſſion of Parliament was ended; and the following Year it was taken off, by concert between our General and the *States*, without any Reaſon aſſigned for the Satisfaction of the Kingdom. The next and ſome enſuing Campaigns, further and additional Forces were allowed by Parliament for the War in *Flanders*; and every new Supply the *Dutch* gradually leſſened their Proportions; though the Parliament addreſſed the Queen that the *States* might be deſired to obſerve them according to Agreement; which had no other Effect, than to teach them to elude it, by making their Troops nominal Corps, as they did by keeping up the Numbers of Regiments, but ſinking a fifth Part of the Men

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and Money. So that now Things are juſt inverted, and in all new Levies we contribute a third more than the *Dutch*, who at firſt were obliged to the ſame proportion more than us.

Beſides, the more Towns we conquer for the *States*, the worſe Condition we are in towards reducing the common Enemy, and conſequently of putting an End to the War. For they make no Scruple of employing the Troops of their Quota, towards garriſoning every Town as faſt as it is taken, directly contrary to the Agreement between us, by which all Garriſons are particularly excluded. This is at length arrived, by ſeveral Steps, to ſuch a height, that there are at preſent in the Field, not ſo many Forces under the Duke of *M———h*'s Command in *Flanders*, as *Britain* alone maintains for that Service, nor have been for ſome Years paſt. The Troops we maintain in *Flanders* (as appears by the Votes of the Houſe of Commons for the Year 1709,) are forty thouſand, the original Quota; ten thouſand the firſt Augmentation; three thouſand *Palatines*; four thouſand ſix hundred thirty-nine *Saxons*; *Bothmar*'s Regiment of eight hundred Men; and a further Augmentation taken that Year into the Service, of about two thouſand: making in the whole upwards of ſixty thouſand: And it is well known, that the Battles of *Hochſted* and *Ramellies* were fought with not above fifty thouſand Men on a Side.

The Duke of *Marlborough* having entered the Enemies Lines, and taking *Bouchain*, formed tbe Deſign of keeping ſo great a Number of Troops, and particularly of Cavalry, in *Liſle*, *Tournay*, *Doway*, and the Country between, as ſhould be able to haraſs all the neighbouring Provinces of *France*, during the Winter, prevent the Enemy from erecting their Magazines, and by conſequence, from ſubſiſting their Forces next Spring, and render it impoſſible for them to aſſemble their Army another Year, without going back behind the *Soame* to do it. In order to effect this Project, it was neceſſary to be at an Expence extraordinary of Forage for the Troops, of building Stables, finding Fire and Candle for the Soldiers, with other incident Charges. The Qu—n readily agreed to furniſh her Share of the firſt Article, that of the Forage, which only belonged to her. But the *States* inſiſting that her Majeſty ſhould likewiſe come into a Proportion of the other Articles, which belonged totally to them: She agreed even to that, rather than a Deſign of this Importance ſhould fail. And yet we know it hath failed, and that the *Dutch* refuſed their Conſent, till the Time was paſt for putting it in Execution, even in the opinion of thoſe who propoſed it. Perhaps a certain Article in the Treaties of Contributions, ſubmitted to by ſuch of the *French* Dominions as pay them to the *States*, was the principal Cauſe of defeating this Project; ſince

one great Advantage to have been gained by it, was, as before is mentioned, to have hindred the Enemy from erecting their Magazines: And one Article in thoſe Treaties of Contributions is, that the Product of thoſe Countries ſhall paſs free and unmoleſted. So that the Queſtion was reduced to this ſhort Iſſue, Whether the *Dutch* ſhould loſe thir paultry Benefit, or the common Cauſe an Advantage of ſuch mighty Importance?

The Sea being the Element where we might moſt probably carry on the War with any Advantage to ourſelves, it was agreed that we ſhould bear five Eights of the Charge in that Service, and the *Dutch* the other three: And by the Grand Alliance, whatever we or *Holland* ſhould conquer in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, was to accrue to the Conquerors. It might therefore have been hoped, that this *Maritime Ally* of ours, would have made up in their Fleet, what they fell ſhort in their Army; but quite otherwiſe, they never once furniſhed their Quota, either of Ships or Men; for if ſome few of their Fleet now and then appeared, it was no more than appearing, for they immediately ſeparated to look to their Merchants and protect their Trade. And we may remember very well when theſe *Guarantees of our Succeſſion*, after having one Ship for many Months together in the *Mediterranean*, ſent that Part of their Quota thither, and furniſhed nothing to us, at the ſame time that they alarmed us with the Rumour of an Invaſion. And laſt Year, when Sir *James Wiſhart* was diſpatched into *Holland* to expoſtulate with the *States*, and to deſire they would make good their Agreements, in ſo important a Part of the Service; he met with ſuch a Reception as ill became a Republick to give, that lies under ſo many great Obligations to us; in ſhort, ſuch a one, as thoſe only deſerve, who are content to take.

It hath likewiſe been no ſmall Inconvenience to us, that the *Dutch* are always ſlow in paying their Subſidies, by which means the Weight and Preſſure of the Payment lies upon the Queen, as well as the Blame, if her Majeſty be not very exact; nor will even this always content our Allies. For in *July* 1711, the King of *Spain* was paid all his Subſidies to the firſt of *January* next; nevertheleſs he hath ſince complained for want of Money; and his Secretary threatened, that if we would not further ſupply his Majeſty, he could not anſwer for what might happen; although K—g *C*——*s* had not at that time, one Third of the Troops for which he was paid; and even thoſe he had, were neither paid nor cloathed.

I ſhall add one Example more, to ſhew how this Prince has treated the Q—n, to whom he owes ſuch infinite Obligations. Her Maj—ty borrowed two hundred thouſand Pounds from the *Genoeſe*, and ſent it to *Barcelona*, for the Payment of the *Spaniſh*

niſh Army: This Money was to be re-coined into the current Species of *Catalonia*, which by the Allay is lower in Value 25 *l. per Cent.* The Q—n had expected, as ſhe had Reaſon, to have the Benefit of this Re-coinage, offering to apply it all to the Uſe of the War; but K—g *C*——*s*, inſtead of conſenting to this, made a Grant of the Coinage to one of his Courtiers; which put a Stop to the Work: And when it was repreſented, that the Army would ſtarve by this Delay, his Majeſty only replied, *Let them ſtarve!* and would not recal his Grant.

I cannot forbear mentioning here another Paſſage concerning Subſidies, to ſhew what Opinion Foreigners have of our Eaſineſs, and how much they reckon themſelves Maſters of our Money, whenever they think fit to call for it. The Queen was by Agreement to pay two hundred thouſand Crowns a Year to the *Pruſſian* Troops, the *States* one hundred thouſand Crowns, and the Emperor only thirty thouſand, for Recruiting, which his Imperial Majeſty never paid. Prince *Eugene* happening to paſs by *Berlin*, the Miniſters of that Court applied themſelves to him for Redreſs in this Particular; and his Highneſs very frankly promiſed them, that in Conſideration of the Deficiency, *Britain* and the *States* ſhould encreaſe their Subſidies to ſeventy thouſand Crowns more between them, and that the Emperor ſhould be punctual for the time to come: This was done by that Prince without any Orders or Power whatſoever. The *Dutch* very reaſonably refuſed conſenting to it; but the *Pruſſian* Miniſter here making his Applications at our Court, prevailed on us to agree to our Proportion, before we could hear what Reſolution would be taken in *Holland*. It is therefore to be hoped, that his *Pruſſian* Majeſty, at the End of this War, will not have the ſame grievous Cauſe of Complaint, which he had at the Cloſe of the laſt; that his Military Cheſt was emptier by twenty thouſand Crowns, than at the time the War began.

The Emperor, as we have already ſaid, was by Stipulation to furniſh ninety thouſand Men againſt the common Enemy, as having no Fleets to maintain, and in Right of his Family, being moſt concerned in the Succeſs of the War. However, this Agreement hath been ſo well obſerved, that from the Beginning of the War to this Day, neither of the two laſt Emperors had ever twenty thouſand Men, on their own Account, in the common Cauſe, excepting once in *Italy*; when the Imperial Court exerted itſelf in a Point they have much more at heart than that of gaining *Spain* or the *Indies* to their Family. When they had ſucceeded in their Attempts on the Side of *Italy*, and obſerved our blind Zeal for puſhing on the War at all Adventures, they ſoon found out the moſt effectual Expedient to ex-

cuſe themſelves. They computed eaſily, that it would coſt them leſs to make large Preſents to one *ſingle Perſon*, than to pay an Army, and turn to as good Account. They thought they could not put their Affairs into better Hands; and therefore wiſely left us to fight their Battles.

Beſides, it appeared by ſeveral Inſtances, how little the Emperor regarded his Allies, or the Cauſe they were engaged in, when once he thought the Empire itſelf was ſecure. 'Tis known enough, that he might ſeveral Times have made a Peace with his diſcontented Subjects in *Hungary*, upon Terms not at all unbefitting either his Dignity or Intereſt: But he rather choſe to ſacrifice the whole Alliance to his private Paſſion, by entirely ſubduing and enſlaving a miſerable People, who had but too much Provocation to take up Arms to free themſelves from the Oppreſſions under which they were groaning: Yet this muſt ſerve as an Excuſe for breaking his agreement, and diverting ſo great a Body of Troops, which might have been employed againſt *France*.

Another Inſtance of the Emperor's Indifference, or rather Diſlike to the Common Cauſe of the Allies, is the Buſineſs of *Toulon*. This Deſign was indeed diſcovered here at home, by a Perſon whom every Body knows to be the Creature of a certain *Great Man*, at leaſt as much noted for his Skill in Gaming as in Politicks, upon the baſe mercenary End of getting Money by Wagers; which was then ſo common a Practice, that I remember a Gentleman in Employment, who having the Curioſity to enquire how Wagers went upon the *Exchange*, found ſome People, deep in the Secret, to have been concerned in that kind of Traffick, as appeared by Premiums named for Towns, which no body but thoſe behind the Curtain could ſuſpect. However, although this Project had gotten wind by ſo ſcandalous a Proceeding, yet *Toulon* might probably have been taken, if the Emperor had not thought fit, in that very Juncture, to detach twelve or fifteen thouſand Men to ſeize *Naples*, as an Enterprize that was more his private and immediate Intereſt. But it was manifeſt that his Imperial Majeſty had no mind to ſee *Toulon* in Poſſeſſion of the Allies; for even with theſe Diſcouragements the Attempt might have ſucceeded, if Prince *Eugene* had not thought fit to oppoſe it; which cannot be imputed to his own Judgment, but to ſome Politick Reaſons of his Court. The Duke of *Savoy* was for attacking the Enemy as ſoon as our Army arrived; but when the Mareſchal *de Theſſe*'s Troops were all come up, to pretend to beſiege the Place, in the Condition we were at that Time, was a Farce and a Jeſt. Had *Toulon* fallen then into our Hands, the Maritime Power of *France* would, in a great meaſure, have been deſtroyed.

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But a much greater Inſtance than either of the foregoing, how little the Emperor regarded us or our Quarrel, after all we had done to ſave his Imperial Crown, and to aſſert the Title of his Brother to the Monarchy of *Spain*, may be brought from the Proceedings of that Court not many Months ago. It was judged, that a War carried on upon the Side of *Italy*, would cauſe a great Diverſion of the *French* Forces, wound them in a very tender Part, and facilitate the Progreſs of our Arms in *Spain*, as well as *Flanders*. It was propoſed by the Duke of *Savoy* to make this Diverſion; and not only a Diverſion during the Summer, but the Winter too, by taking Quarters on this Side of the Hills. Only in order to make him willing and able to perform this Work, two Points were to be ſettled. Firſt, It was neceſſary to end the Diſpute between the Imperial Court and his Royal Highneſs; which had no other Foundation than the Emperor's refuſing to make good ſome Articles of that Treaty, on the Faith of which the Duke engaged in the preſent War, and for the Execution whereof *Britain* and *Holland* became Guarantees, at the Requeſt of the late Emperor *Leopold*. To remove this Difficulty, the Earl of *Peterborow* was diſpatched to *Vienna*, got over ſome Part of thoſe Diſputes, to the Satisfaction of the Duke of *Savoy*, and had put the reſt in a fair way of being accommodated, at the time the Emperor *Joſeph* died. Upon which great Event, the Duke of *Savoy* took the Reſolution of putting himſelf immediately at the Head of the Army, though the whole Matter was not finiſhed, ſince the Common Cauſe required his Aſſiſtance; and that until a new Emperor were elected, it was impoſſible to make good the Treaty to him. In order to enable him, the only thing he aſked was, that he ſhould be reinforced by the Imperial Court with eight thouſand Men, before the End of the Campaign. Mr. *Whitworth* was ſent to *Vienna* to make this Propoſal, and it is credibly reported, that he was impowered rather than fail, to offer forty thouſand Pounds for the March of thoſe eight thouſand Men, if he found it was Want of Ability, and not Inclination, that hindered the ſending them. But he was ſo far from ſucceeding, that it was ſaid, the Miniſters of that Court did not ſo much as give him an Opportunity to tempt them with any particular Sums; but cut off all his Hopes at once, by alledging the Impoſſibility of complying with the Queen's Demands, upon any Conſideration whatſoever. They could not plead their old Excuſe of the War in *Hungary*, which was then brought to an End: They had nothing to offer but ſome general ſpeculative Reaſons, which it would expoſe them to repeat; and ſo, after much Delay, and many trifling Pretences, they utterly refuſed

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ſo ſmall and ſeaſonable an Aſſiſtance; to the Ruin of a Project that would have more terrified *France*, and cauſed a greater Diverſion of their Forces, than a much more numerous Army in any other Part. Thus, for want of eight thouſand Men, for whoſe Winter Campaign the Queen was willing to give forty thouſand Pounds; and for want of executing the Deſign I lately mentioned, of hindring the Enemy from erecting Magazines, towards which her Majeſty was ready, not only to bear her own Proportion, but a Share of that which the *States* were obliged to, our Hopes of taking Winter-Quarters in the North and South Parts of *France* are eluded, and the War left in that Method, which is like to continue it longeſt. Can there an Example be given in the whole Courſe of this War, where we have treated the pettieſt Prince, with whom we had to deal, in ſo contemptuous a Manner? Did we ever once conſider what we could afford, or what we were obliged to, when our Aſſiſtance was deſired, even while we lay under immediate Apprehenſions of being invaded.

When *Portugal* came, as a Confederate, into the Grand Alliance, it was ſtipulated, That the Empire, *England* and *Holland*, ſhould each maintain four thouſand Men of their own Troops in that Kingdom, and pay between them a Million of Pattacoons to the King of *Portugal*, for the Support of twenty eight thouſand *Portugueſe*; which Number of forty thouſand, was to be the Confederate Army againſt *Spain* on the *Portugal* Side. This Treaty was ratified by all the three Powers. But in a ſhort time after, the Emperor declared himſelf unable to comply with his Part of the Agreement, and ſo left the two thirds upon us; who very generouſly undertook that Burthen, and at the ſame time two thirds of the Subſidies for Maintenance of the *Portugueſe* Troops. But neither is this the worſt Part of the Story: For, although the *Dutch* did indeed ſend their own particular Quota of four thouſand Men to *Portugal* (which however they would not agree to, but upon Condition, that the other two thirds ſhould be ſupplied by us;) yet they never took care to recruit them: For in the Year 1706, the *Portugueſe*, *Britiſh* and *Dutch* Forces, having marched with the Earl of *G——y* into *Caſtile*, and by the noble Conduct of that General, being forced to retire into *Valentia*, it was found neceſſary to raiſe a new Army of the *Portugal* Side, where the Queen hath, at ſeveral times, encreaſed her Eſtabliſhment of ten thouſand five hundred Men, and the *Dutch* never replaced one ſingle Man, nor paid one Penny of their Subſidies to *Portugal* in ſix Years.

The *Spaniſh* Army on the Side of *Catalonia* is, or ought to be, about fifty thouſand Men (excluſive of *Portugal*): And here

here the War hath been carried on almoſt entirely at our Coſt. For this whole Army is paid by the Queen, excepting only ſeven Battalions and fourteen Squadrons of *Dutch* and *Palatine*; and even fifteen hundred of theſe are likewiſe in our Pay; beſides the Sums given to King *Charles* for Subſidies and the Maintenance of his Court. Neither are our Troops at *Gibraltar* included within this Number. And further, we alone have been at all the Charge of Tranſporting the Forces firſt ſent from *Genoa* to *Barcelona*; and of all the Imperial Recruits from time to time: And have likewiſe paid vaſt Sums as Levy-Money, for every individual Man and Horſe ſo furniſhed to recruit, though the Horſes were ſcarce worth the Price of Tranſportation. But this hath beed almoſt the conſtant Misfortune of our Fleet, during the preſent War; inſtead of being employed on ſome Enterprize for the Good of the Nation, or even for the Protection of our Trade, to be wholly taken up in Tranſporting Soldiers.

We have actually conquered all *Bavaria*, *Ulm*, *Auſburg*, *Landau*, and a great Part of *Alſace*, for the Emperor: And by the Troops we have furniſhed, the Armies we have paid, and the Diverſions we have given to the Enemies Forces, have chiefly contributed to the Conqueſts of *Milan*, *Mantua*, and *Mirandola*, and to the Recovery of the *Dutchy* of *Modena*. The laſt Emperor drained the Wealth of thoſe Countries into his own Coffers, without encreaſing his Troops againſt *France* by ſuch mighty Acquiſitions, or yielding to the moſt reaſonable Requeſts we have made.

Of the many Towns we have taken for the *Dutch*, we have conſented by the Barrier-Treaty, that all thoſe which were not in Poſſeſſion of *Spain*, upon the Death of the late Catholick King, ſhall be part of the *States* Dominions, and that they ſhall have the military Power in the moſt conſiderable of the reſt; which is, in effect, to be the abſolute Sovereigns of the whole. And the *Hollanders* have already made ſuch good uſe of their Time, that, in conjunction with our G——l, the Oppreſſions of *Flanders* are much greater than ever.

And this Treatment which we have received from our two principal Allies, hath been pretty well copied by moſt other Princes in the Confederacy, with whom we have any Dealings. For inſtance, ſeven *Portugueſe* Regiments, after the Battle of *Almanza*, went off, with the reſt of that broken Army, to *Catalonia*: The King of *Portugal* ſaid, he was not able to pay them, while they were out of his Country; the Queen conſented therefore to do it herſelf, provided the King would raiſe as many more to ſupply their Place. This he engaged to do, but never performed. Notwithſtanding which, his Subſidies

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were conſtantly paid him by my Lord G———n, for almoſt four Years, without any Deduction upon account of thoſe ſeven Regiments, directly contrary to the ſeventh Article of our Offenſive Alliance with that Crown, where it is agreed, that a Deduction ſhall be made out of thoſe Subſidies, in proportion to the Number of Men wanting in that Complement, which the King is to maintain. But whatever might have been the Reaſons for this Proceeding, it ſeems they are above the Underſtanding of the preſent Lord Treaſurer; who not entering into thoſe Refinements, of paying the *publick* Money upon *private* Conſiderations, hath been ſo uncourtly as to ſtop it. This Diſappointment, I ſuppoſe, hath put the Court of *Lisbon* upon other Expedients of raiſing the Price of Forage, ſo as to force us either to leſſen our Number of Troops, or be at double Expence in maintaining them; and this at a Time when their own Product, as well as the Import of Corn, was never greater; and of demanding a Duty upon the Soldiers Clothes we carry over for thoſe Troops, which have been their ſole Defence againſt an inveterate Enemy; and whoſe Example might have infuſed Courage, as well as taught them Diſcipline, if their Spirits had been capable of receiving either.

In order to augment our Forces every Year, in the ſame Proportion as thoſe, for whom we fight, diminiſh theirs, we have been obliged to hire Troops from ſeveral Princes of the Empire, whoſe Miniſters and Reſidents here, have perpetually importuned the Court with unreaſonable Demands, under which our late Miniſters thought fit to be paſſive. For thoſe Demands were always backed with a Threat to recal their Soldiers, which was a Thing not to be heard of, becauſe it might *diſcontent the Dutch*. In the mean time, thoſe Princes never ſent their Contingent to the Emperor, as by the Laws of the Empire they are obliged to do, but gave for their Excuſe, that we had already hired all they could ſpare.

BUT if all this is true: If, according to what I have affirmed, we began this War contrary to Reaſon: If, as the other Party themſelves, upon all Occaſions, acknowledge, the Succeſs we have had was more than we could reaſonably expect: If, after all our Succeſs, we have not made that Uſe of it, which in Reaſon we ought to have done: If we have made weak and fooliſh Bargains with our Allies, ſuffered them tamely to break every Article, even in thoſe Bargains to our Diſadvantage, and allowed them to treat us with Inſolence and Contempt, at the very Inſtant when we were gaining Towns, Provinces and Kingdoms for them, at the Price of our Ruin, and without any Proſpect of Intereſt to ourſelves: If we have conſumed all our Strength in attacking the Enemy on the

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ſtrongeſt Side, where (as the old Duke of *Schomberg* expreſſed it) *to engage with* France, *was to take a Bull by the Horns*; and left wholly unattempted, that Part of the War, which could only enable us to continue or to end it. If all this, I ſay, be our Caſe, it is a very obvious Queſtion to aſk, by what Motives, or what Management, we are thus become the *Dupes* and *Bubbles* of *Europe?* Sure it cannot be owing to the Stupidity ariſing from the Coldneſs of our Climate, ſince thoſe among our Allies, who have given us moſt Reaſon to complain, are as far removed from the Sun as ourſelves.

If in laying open the real Cauſes of our preſent Miſery, I am forced to ſpeak with ſome Freedom, I think it will require no Apology; Reputation is the ſmalleſt Sacrifice thoſe can make us, who have been the Inſtruments of our Ruin; becauſe it is that, for which, in all Probability, they have the leaſt Value. So that in expoſing the Actions of ſuch Perſons, I cannot be ſaid, properly ſpeaking, to do them an Injury. But as it will be ſome Satisfaction to the People, to know by whom they have been ſo long abuſed; ſo it may be of great Uſe to us and our Poſterity, not to truſt the Safety of their Country in the Hands of thoſe who act by ſuch Principles, and from ſuch Motives.

I have already obſerved, that when the Counſels of this War were debated in the late King's Time, my Lord *G———n* was then ſo averſe from entering into it, that he rather choſe to give up his Employment, and tell the King he could ſerve him no longer. Upon that Prince's Death, although the Grounds of our Quarrel with *France* had received no manner of Addition, yet this Lord thought fit to alter his Sentiments; for the Scene was quite changed; his Lordſhip and the Family with whom he was engaged by ſo complicated an Alliance, were in the higheſt Credit poſſible with the Q——n: The Treaſurer's Staff was ready for his Lordſhip, the Duke was to command the Army, and the Dutcheſs, by her Employments, and the Favour ſhe was poſſeſſed of, to be always neareſt her M——y's Perſon; by which the whole Power, at home and abroad, would be devolved upon that Family. This was a Proſpect ſo very inviting, that, to confeſs the Truth, it could not be eaſily withſtood by any who have ſo keen an Appetite for Wealth or Ambition. By an Agreement ſubſequent to the Grand Alliance, we were to aſſiſt the *Dutch* with forty thouſand Men, all to be commanded by the D—— of *M———h*. So that whether this War were prudently begun or not, it is plain, that the true Spring or Motive of it, was the aggrandizing a particular Family; and in ſhort, a War of the *General* and the *Miniſtry*, and not of the *Prince* or *People*; ſince thoſe very

very Perſons were againſt it when they knew the Power, and conſequently the Profit, would be in other Hands.

With theſe Meaſures fell in all that Set of People, who are called the *Monied Men*; ſuch as had raiſed vaſt Sums by trading with Stocks and Funds, and lending upon great Intereſt and Præmiums; whoſe perpetual Harveſt is War, and whoſe beneficial way of Traffick muſt very much decline by a Peace.

In that whole Chain of Encroachments made upon us by the *Dutch*, which I have above deduced, and under thoſe ſeveral groſs Impoſitions from other *Powers*, if any one ſhould aſk, why our G——l continued ſo eaſy to the laſt? I know no other way ſo probable, or indeed ſo charitable to account for it, as by that unmeaſurable Love of Wealth, which his beſt Friends allow to be his predominant Paſſion. However, I ſhall wave any thing that is perſonal upon this Subject. I ſhall ſay nothing of thoſe great Preſents made by ſeveral Princes, which the Soldiers uſed to call Winter Foraging, and ſaid it was better than that of the Summer; of Two and an half *per Cent.* ſubſtracted out of all the Subſidies we pay in thoſe Parts, which amounts to no inconſiderable Sum; and laſtly, of the grand Perquiſites in a long ſucceſsful War, which are ſo amicably adjuſted between him and the *States*.

But when the War was thus begun, there ſoon fell in other Incidents here at home, which made the Continuance of it neceſſary for thoſe who were the chief Adviſers. The *Whigs* were at that time out of all Credit or Conſideration: The reigning Favourites had always carried what was called the *Tory Principle*, at leaſt as high as our Conſtitution could bear; and moſt others in great Employments, were wholly in the Church-Intereſt. Theſe laſt, among whom ſeveral were Perſons of the greateſt Merit, Quality and Conſequence, were not able to endure the many Inſtances of Pride, Inſolence, Avarice and Ambition, which thoſe Favourites began ſo early to diſcover, nor to ſee them preſuming to be the ſole Diſpenſers of the Royal Favour. However, their Oppoſition was to no purpoſe; they wreſtled with too great a Power, and were ſoon cruſhed under it. For, thoſe in Poſſeſſion finding they could never be quiet in their Uſurpations, while others had any Credit, who were at leaſt upon an equal Foot of Merit, began to make Overtures to the diſcarded *Whigs*, who would be content with any Terms of Accommodation. Thus commenced this *Solemn League and Covenant*, which hath ever ſince been cultivated with ſo much Application. The great Traders in Money were wholly devoted to the *Whigs*, who had firſt raiſed them. The Army, the Court, and the Treaſury, continued under the old *deſpotick* Adminiſtration: The *Whigs* were received

ceived into Employment, left to manage the Parliament, cry down the Landed Intereſt, and worry the Church. Mean time our Allies, who were not ignorant that all this artificial Structure had no true Foundation in the Hearts of the People, reſolved to make their beſt Uſe of it, as long as it ſhould laſt. And the General's Credit being raiſed to a great height at home, by our Succeſs in *Flanders*, the *Dutch* began their gradual Impoſitions, leſſening their Quota's, breaking their Stipulations, garriſoning the Towns we took for them, without ſupplying their Troops; with many other Infringements: All which we were forced to ſubmit to, becauſe the General was *made eaſy*; becauſe the Monied Men at home were fond of the War; becauſe the *Whigs* were not yet firmly ſettled; and becauſe that exorbitant Degree of Power, which was built upon a ſuppoſed Neceſſity of employing particular Perſons, would go off in a Peace. It is needleſs to add, that the Emperor, and other Princes, followed the Example of the *Dutch*, and ſucceeded as well, for the ſame Reaſons.

I have here imputed the Continuance of the War to the mutual Indulgence between our General and Allies, wherein they both ſo well found their Accounts; to the Fears of the *Money-changers*, leſt their *Tables ſhould be overthrown*; to the Deſigns of the *Whigs*, who apprehended the Loſs of their Credit and Employments in a Peace; and to thoſe at home, who held their immoderate Engroſſments of Power and Favour, by no other Tenure than their own Preſumption upon the Neceſſity of Affairs. The Truth of this will appear indiſputable, by conſidering with what Unanimity and Concert theſe ſeveral Parties acted towards that great End.

When the Vote paſſed in the Houſe of Lords againſt any Peace, without *Spain* being reſtored to the *Auſtrian* Family, the Earl of *W——n* told the Houſe, That indeed it was impoſſible and impracticable to recover *Spain*; but however there were *certain Reaſons* why ſuch a Vote ſhould be made at that time; which Reaſons wanted no Explanation: For the G——l and the M——y having refuſed to accept very advantageous Offers of a Peace, after the Battle of *Ramellies*, were forced to take in a Set of Men, with a previous Bargain, to ſkreen them from the Conſequences of that Miſcarriage. And accordingly, upon the firſt ſucceeding Opportunity, which was that of the Prince of *Denmark*'s Death, the chief Leaders of the Party were brought into ſeveral great Employments.

So when the Q—— was no longer able to bear the Tyranny and Inſolence of thoſe ungrateful Servants, who as they *waxed the Fatter*, did but *kick the more*; our two great Allies abroad, and our Stock-jobbers at home, took immediately the Alarm;

Alarm; applied the neareſt way to the Throne, by Memorials and Meſſages, jointly directing her Majeſty not to change her Secretary or Treaſurer; who for the true Reaſons that theſe officious Intermedlers demanded their Continuance, ought never to have been admitted into the leaſt Degree of Truſt; ſince what they did was nothing leſs than betraying the Intereſt of their native Country, to thoſe Princes, who in their Turns were to do what they could to ſupport them in Power at home.

Thus it plainly appears, that there was a Conſpiracy on all Sides to go on with thoſe Meaſures, which muſt perpetuate the War; and a Conſpiracy founded upon the Intereſt and Ambition of each Party; which begat ſo firm a Union, that inſtead of wondering why it laſted ſo long, I am aſtoniſhed to think how it came to be broken. The Prudence, Courage, and Firmneſs of her Majeſty in all the Steps of that great Charge, would, if the Particulars were truly related, make a very ſhining Part in Story: Nor is her Judgment leſs to be admired, which directed Her in the Choice of perhaps the only Perſons who had Skill, Credit, and Reſolution enough to be her Inſtruments in overthrowing ſo many Difficulties.

Some would pretend to leſſen the Merit of this, by telling us, that the Rudeneſs, the Tyranny, the Oppreſſion, the Ingratitude of the late Favourites towards their Miſtreſs, were no longer to be born. They produce Inſtances to ſhew, how Her M——y was purſued through all her Retreats, particularly at *Windſor*; where, after the Enemy had poſſeſſed themſelves of every Inch of Ground, they at laſt attacked and ſtormed the Caſtle, forcing the Qu—n to fly to an adjoining Cottage, purſuant to the Advice of *Solomon*, who tells us, *It is better to dwell in a Corner of the Houſe-top, than with a brawling Woman in a wide Houſe.* They would have it, that ſuch continued ill Uſage was enough to enflame the meekeſt Spirit: They blame the Favourites in point of Policy, and think it nothing extraordinary, that the Qu—n ſhould be at an End of her Patience, and reſolve to diſcard them. But I am of another Opinion, and think their Proceedings were right. For nothing is ſo apt to break even the braveſt Spirits, as a continual Chain of Oppreſſions: One Injury is beſt defended by a ſecond, and this by a third. By theſe Steps, the old *Maſters of the Palace* in *France* become *Maſters of the Kingdom*; and by theſe Steps, a *G——l during Pleaſure*, might have grown into a *G——l for Life*, and a *G——l for Life* into a *King*. So that I ſtill inſiſt upon it as a Wonder, how her M——y, thus beſieged on all ſides, was able to extricate herſelf.

HAVING

HAVING thus mentioned the real Cauſes, tho' diſguiſed under ſpecious Pretences, which have ſo long continued the War; I muſt beg leave to reaſon a little with theſe Perſons who are againſt any Peace, but what they call a *Good One*; and explain themſelves, that no Peace can be *good*, without an entire Reſtoration of *Spain* to the Houſe of *Auſtria*. It is to be ſuppoſed, that what I am to ſay upon this Part of the Subject, will have little Influence on thoſe, whoſe particular Ends or Deſigns of any ſort, lead them to wiſh the Continuance of the War. I mean the General and our Allies abroad; the Knot of late Favourites at home; the Body of ſuch as traffick in Stocks; and laſtly, that Set of factious Politicians, who were ſo violently bent, at leaſt, upon *clipping* our Conſtitution in Church and State. Therefore I ſhall not apply myſelf to any of thoſe, but to all others indifferently, whether *Whig* or *Tory*, whoſe private Intereſt is beſt anſwered by the Welfare of their Country. And if among theſe there be any, who think we ought to fight on till King *Charles* is quietly ſettled in the Monarchy of *Spain*, I believe there are ſeveral Points which they have not thoroughly conſidered.

For, Firſt, It is to be obſerved, that this Reſolution againſt any Peace without *Spain*, is a new Incident, grafted upon the original Quarrel, by the Intrigues of a Faction among us, who prevailed to give it the Sanction of a Vote in both Houſes of Parliament, to juſtify thoſe, whoſe Intereſt lay in perpetuating the War. And, as this Proceeding was againſt the Practice of all Princes and States, whoſe Intentions were fair and honourable; ſo is it contrary to common Prudence, as well as Juſtice. I might add, that it was impious too, by preſuming to controul Events, which are only in the Hands of God. Ours and the *States* Complaint againſt *France* and *Spain*, are deduced in each of our Declarations of War, and our Pretenſions ſpecified in the *eighth Article* of the Grand Alliance; but there is not in any of theſe, the leaſt mention of demanding *Spain* for the Houſe of *Auſtria*, or of refuſing any Peace without that Condition. Having already made an Extract from both Declarations of War, I ſhall here give a Tranſlation of the eighth Article of the Grand Alliance, which will put this Matter out of Diſpute.

The Eighth Article of the Grand Alliance.

WHEN the War is once undertaken, none of the Parties ſhall have the Liberty to enter upon a Treaty with the Enemy, but jointly, and in concert with others. Nor is Peace to be made without having firſt obtained a juſt und reaſonable Satis-

faction for his Ceſarean *Majeſty, and for his Royal Majeſty of* Great Britain, *and a particular Security to the Lords the* States-General, *of their Dominions, Provinces, Titles, Navigations, and Commerce, and a ſufficient Proviſion, that the Kingdoms of* France *and* Spain *be never united, or come under the Government of the ſame Perſon, or that the ſame Man may never be King of both Kingdoms; and particularly that the* French *may never be in Poſſeſſion of the* Spaniſh Weſt-Indies; *and that they may not have the Liberty of Navigation, for Conveniency of Trade, under any Pretence whatſoever, neither directly nor indirectly; except it is agreed, that the Subjects of* Great Britain *and* Holland, *may have full Power to uſe and enjoy all the ſame Privileges, Rights, Immunities and Liberties of Commerce, by Land and Sea, in* Spain, *in the* Mediterranean, *and in all the Places and Countries, which the late King of* Spain, *at the time of his Death, was in Poſſeſſion of, as well in* Europe, *as elſewhere, as they did then uſe and enjoy; or which the Subjects of both, or each Nation, could uſe and enjoy, by virtue of any Right, obtained before the Death of the ſaid King of* Spain, *either by Treaties, Conventions, Cuſtom, or any other way whatſoever.*

Here, we ſee the Demands intended to be inſiſted on by the Allies upon any Treaty of Peace, are, a juſt and reaſonable Satisfaction for the Emperor and King of *Great Britain*, a Security to the *States-General* for their Dominions, &c. and a ſufficient Proviſion, that *France* and *Spain* be never united under the ſame Man, as King of both Kingdoms. The reſt relates to the Liberty of Trade and Commerce for us and the *Dutch*; but not a Syllable of engaging to diſpoſſeſs the Duke of *Anjou*.

But to know how this new Language of *No Peace without* Spain, was firſt introduced, and at laſt prevailed among us, we muſt begin a great deal higher.

It was the Partition Treaty, which begot the Will in favour of the Duke of *Anjou*: For this naturally led the *Spaniards* to receive a Prince ſupported by a great Power, whoſe Intereſt, as well as Affection, engaged them to preſerve that Monarchy entire, rather than to oppoſe him in favour of another Family, who muſt expect Aſſiſtance from a Number of Confederates, whoſe principal Members had already diſpoſed of what did not belong to them, and by a previous Treaty parcelled out the Monarchy of *Spain*.

Thus the Duke of *Anjou* got into the full Poſſeſſion of all the Kingdoms and States belonging to that Monarchy, as well in the old World, as the new. And whatever the Houſe of *Auſtria* pretended from their Memorials to us and the *States*,

it

it was at that time but too apparent, that the Inclinations of the *Spaniards* were on the Duke's ſide.

However, a War was reſolved, and in order to carry it on with greater Vigour, a Grand Alliance formed, wherein the Ends propoſed to be obtained, are plainly and diſtinctly laid down, as I have already quoted them. It pleaſed God in the Courſe of this War, to bleſs the Armies of the Allies with remarkable Succeſſes; by which we were ſoon put into a Condition of demanding and expecting ſuch Terms of a Peace, as we propoſed to ourſelves when we began the War. But inſtead of this, our Victories only ſerved to lead us on to further viſionary Proſpects; Advantage was taken of the ſanguine Temper, which ſo many Succeſſes had wrought the Nation up to; new romantick Views were propoſed, and the old, reaſonable, ſober Deſign, was forgot.

This was the Artifice of thoſe here, who were ſure to grow richer, as the Publick became poorer, and who after the Reſolutions, which the two Houſes were prevailed upon to make, might have carried on the War with Safety to themſelves, till Malt and Land were mortgaged, 'till a general Exciſe were eſtabliſhed; and the *dezieme denier* raiſed, by *Collectors in Red Coats*. And this was juſt the Circumſtance which it ſuited their Intereſts to be in.

The Houſe of *Auſtria* approved this Scheme with Reaſon, ſince whatever would be obtained by the Blood and Treaſure of others, was to accrue to that Family, and they only lent their Name to the Cauſe.

The *Dutch* might, perhaps, have grown reſty under their Burthen; but Care was likewiſe taken of That by a *Barrier Treaty* made with the *States*, which deſerveth ſuch Epithets as I care not to beſtow: But may perhaps conſider it, at a proper Occaſion, in a *Diſcourſe* by itſelf.

By this Treaty, the Condition of the War, with reſpect to the *Dutch*, was widely altered: They fought no longer for Security, but for Grandeur; and we, inſtead of labouring to make them *ſafe*, muſt beggar ourſelves to render them *Formidable*.

Will any one contend, that if in the Treaty at *Gertruydenburg*, we could have been ſatisfied with ſuch Terms of a Peace, as we propoſed to ourſelves by the Grand Alliance, the *French* would not have allowed them? 'Tis plain, they offered many more, and much greater, than ever we thought to inſiſt on, when the War began: And they had reaſon to grant, as well as we to demand them, ſince Conditions of Peace do certainly turn upon Events of War. But ſurely there is ſome Meaſure to be obſerved in this: Thoſe who have defended the Proceed-

ceedings of our Negotiators at *Gertruydenburg*, dwell very much upon their Zeal and Patience, in endeavouring to work the *French* up to their Demands, but ſay nothing to juſtify thoſe Demands, or the Probability, that *France* would ever accept them. Some of the Preliminary Articles were ſo very Extravagant, that in all human Probability we could not have obtained them by a ſucceſsful War of forty Years. One of them was inconſiſtent with common Reaſon; wherein the Confederates reſerved to themſelves full Liberty of demanding, what further Conditions they ſhould think fit; and in the mean time, *France* was to deliver up ſeveral of their ſtrongeſt Towns in a Month. Theſe Articles were very gravely Signed by our Plenipotentiaries, and thoſe of *Holland*, but not by the *French*, though it ought to have been done interchangeably; nay they were brought over by the Secretary of the Ambaſſy; and the Miniſters here prevailed on the Queen to execute a Ratification of Articles, which only one Part had Signed: This was an Abſurdity in Form, as well as in Reaſon, becauſe the uſual Form of a Ratification is, with a Preamble, ſhewing, *That whereas our Miniſters and thoſe of the Allies, and of the Enemy, have Signed*, &c. *We Ratify*, &c. The Perſon who brought over the Articles, ſaid in all Companies, (and perhaps believed) that it was a Pity, we had not demanded more, for the *French* were in a Diſpoſition to refuſe us nothing we would aſk. One of our Plenipotentiaries affected to have the ſame Concern, and particularly, that we had not obtained ſome further Security for the Empire on the *Upper Rhine*.

What could be the Deſign of all this Grimace, but to amuſe the People, and raiſe Stocks for their Friends in the Secret, to Sell to Advantage? I have too great a Reſpect for the Abilities of thoſe who acted in this Negotiation, to believe they hoped for any other Iſſue from it, than what was found by the Event. Give me leave to ſuppoſe the continuance of the War was the Thing at Heart, among thoſe in Power, both Abroad, and at Home, and then I can eaſily ſhew the Conſiſtency of their Proceedings; otherwiſe they are wholly unaccountable and abſurd. Did thoſe, who inſiſted on ſuch wild Demands, ever ſincerely intend a Peace? Did they really think that going on with the War was more eligible for their Country, than the leaſt Abatement of thoſe Conditions? Was the ſmalleſt of them worth ſix Millions a Year, and an hundred thouſand Men's Lives? Was there no way to provide for the Safety of *Britain*, or the Security of its Trade, but by the *French* King's turning his own Arms to beat his Grandſon out of *Spain*? If theſe able Stateſmen were ſo truly concerned for our Trade,

which they made the Pretence of the War's Beginning, as well as Continuance, why did they ſo neglect it in thoſe very Preliminaries, where the Enemy made ſo many Conceſſions, and where all that related to the Advantage of *Holland*, or the other Confederates, was expreſly ſettled? But whatever concerned us, was to be left to a general Treaty; no Tariff agreed on with *France* or the *Low Countries*, only the *Scheld* was to remain ſhut, which ruins our Commerce with *Antwerp*. Our Trade with *Spain* was referred the ſame way; but this they will pretend to be of no Conſequence, becauſe that Kingdom was to be under the Houſe of *Auſtria*; and we had already made a Treaty with King *Charles*. I have indeed heard of a Treaty made by Mr. *Stanhope*, with that Prince, for ſettling our Commerce with *Spain*: But whatever it were, there was another between Us and *Holland*, which went Hand in Hand with it, I mean that of *Barrier*, wherein a Clauſe was inſerted, by which all Advantages propoſed for *Britain*, are to be in common with *Holland*.

ANOTHER Point which, I doubt, thoſe have not conſidered, who are againſt any Peace with *Spain*, is, that the Face of Affairs in *Chriſtendom*, ſince the Emperor's Death, hath been very much changed. By this Accident the Views and Intereſts of ſeveral Princes and States in the Alliance, have taken a new Turn, and I believe, it will be found that Ours ought to do ſo too. We have ſufficiently blundered once already, by changing our Meaſures with regard to a Peace, while our Affairs continued in the ſame Poſture; and it will be too much in Conſcience to blunder again by *not* changing the firſt, when the others are ſo much altered.

To have a Prince of the *Auſtrian* Family on the Throne of *Spain*, is undoubtedly more deſirable than one of the Houſe of *Bourbon*; but to have the Empire and *Spaniſh* Monarchy united in the ſame Perſon, is a dreadful Conſideration, and directly oppoſite to that wiſe Principle, on which the Eighth Article of the Grand Alliance is founded *.

To this perhaps it will be objected, that the indolent Character of the *Auſtrian* Princes, the wretched Oeconomy of that Government, the want of a Naval Force, the remote Diſtance of their ſeveral Territories from each other, would never ſuffer an Emperor, though at the ſame time King of *Spain*, to become

* We and *Holland*, as well as *Portugal*, were ſo apprehenſive of this, that by the 25th Article of the offenſive Alliance, his *Portugueze* Majeſty was not to acknowledge the Arch-duke for King of *Spain*, till the two late Emperors had made a Ceſſion to *Charles* of the ſaid Monarchy.

become Formidable: On the contrary, that his Dependance muſt continually be on *Great Britain*; and the Advantages of Trade, by a Peace founded upon that Condition, would ſoon make us Amends for all the Expence of the War.

In Anſwer to this, let us conſider the Circumſtances we muſt be in, before ſuch a Peace could be obtained, if it were at all practicable. We muſt become not only poor for the preſent, but reduced by further Mortgages to a State of Beggary, for endleſs Years to come. Compare ſuch a weak Condition as this with ſo great an Acceſſion of Strength to *Auſtria*, and then determine how much an Emperor, in ſuch a State of Affairs, would either fear or need *Britain*.

Conſider, that the Compariſon is not formed between a Prince of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, Emperor and King of *Spain*; and between a Prince of the *Bourbon* Family, King of *France* and *Spain*; but between a Prince of the latter only King of *Spain*, and one of the former uniting both Crowns in his own Perſon.

What Returns of Gratitude can we expect, when we are no longer wanted? Has all that we have hitherto done for the Imperial Family been taken as a Favour, or only received as the Due of the *Auguſtiſſima Caſa?*

Will the Houſe of *Auſtria* yield the leaſt Acre of Land, the leaſt Article of ſtrained and even uſurped Prerogative, to reſettle the Minds of thoſe Princes in the Alliance, who are alarmed at the Conſequences of this Turn of Affairs, occaſioned by the Emperor's Death? We are aſſured it never will. Do we then imagine, that thoſe Princes, who dread the overgrown Power of the *Auſtrian*, as much as that of the *Bourbon* Family, will continue in our Alliance, upon a Syſtem contrary to that which they engaged with us upon? For Inſtance, What can the Duke of *Savoy* expect in ſuch a Caſe? Will he have any Choice left him but that of being a Slave and a Frontier to *France*; or a *Vaſſal*, in the utmoſt Extent of the Word, to the Imperial Court? Will he not therefore, of the two Evils chooſe the leaſt; by ſubmitting to a Maſter, who has no immediate Claim upon him, and to whoſe Family he is nearly allied; rather than to another, who hath already revived ſeveral Claims upon him, and threatens to revive more?

Nor are the *Dutch* more inclined than the reſt of *Europe*, that the *Empire* and *Spain* ſhould be united in King *Charles*, whatever they may now pretend. *On the contrary, 'tis known to ſeveral Perſons, that upon the Death of the late Emperor* Joſeph, *the* States *reſolved, that thoſe two Powers ſhould not be joined in the ſame Perſon:* And this they determine as a fundamental Maxim,

Maxim, by which they intended to proceed. So that *Spain* was firſt given up by them; and ſince they maintain no Troops in that Kingdom, it ſhould ſeem, that they underſtand the Duke of *Anjou* to be lawful Monarch.

THIRDLY, Thoſe who are againſt any Peace without *Spain*, if they be ſuch as no way find their private Account by the War, may perhaps change their Sentiments, if they will reflect a little upon our preſent Condition.

I had two Reaſons for not ſooner publiſhing this Diſcourſe: The firſt was, becauſe I would give Way to others, who might argue very well upon the ſame Subject, from general Topicks and Reaſon, though they might be ignorant of ſeveral Facts, which I had the Opportunity to know. The Second was, becauſe I found it would be neceſſary, in the courſe of this Argument, to ſay ſomething of the State to which this War hath reduced us: At the ſame Time I knew, that ſuch a Diſcovery ought to be made as late as poſſible, and at another Juncture would not only be very indiſcreet, but might perhaps be dangerous.

It is the Folly of too many, to miſtake the Eccho of a *London* Coffee-houſe for the Voice of the Kingdom. The City Coffee-houſes have been, for ſome Years, filled with People, whoſe Fortunes depend upon the *Bank*, *Eaſt-India*, or ſome other Stock: Every new Fund to theſe, is like a new Mortgage to an Uſurer, whoſe Compaſſion for a young Heir is exactly the ſame with that of a Stock-jobber to the Landed Gentry. At the Court-End of the Town, the like Places of Reſort are frequented either by Men out of Place, and conſequently Enemies to the preſent Miniſtry, or by Officers of the Army: No wonder then if the general Cry, in all ſuch Meetings, be againſt any Peace either *with Spain*, or *without*; which, in other Words, is no more than this, That diſcontented Men deſire another Change of Miniſtry; that Soldiers would be glad to keep their Commiſſions; and, that the Creditors have Money ſtill, and would have the Debtors borrow on at the old extorting Rates, while they have any Security to give.

Now, to give the moſt ignorant Reader ſome Idea of our preſent Circumſtances, without troubling him or myſelf with Computations in form: Every body knows, that our Land and Malt Tax amount annually to about two Millions and an half. All other Branches of the Revenue are mortgaged to pay Intereſt, for what we have already borrowed. The yearly Charge of the War is uſually about ſix Millions; to make up which Sum, we

are

are forced to take up, on the Credit of new Funds, about three Millions and an half. This laſt Year the computed Charge of the War came to above a Million more than all the Funds the Parliament could contrive would pay Intereſt for; and ſo we have been forced to divide a Deficiency of twelve hundered thouſand Pounds among the ſeveral Branches of our Expence. This is a Demonſtration, that if the War laſts another Campaign, it will be impoſſible to find Funds for ſupplying it, without mortgaging the Malt-Tax, or by ſome other Method equally deſperate.

If the Peace be made this Winter, we are then to conſider, what Circumſtances we ſhall be in towards paying a Debt of about fifty Millions, which is a fourth Part of the Purchaſe of the whole Iſland, if it were to be ſold.

Towards clearing ourſelves of this monſtrous Incumbrance, ſome of theſe Annuities will expire or pay off the Principal in thirty, forty, or an hundred Years; the Bulk of the Debt muſt be leſſened gradually by the beſt Management we can, out of what will remain of the Land and Malt-Taxes, after paying Guards and Garriſons, and maintaining and ſupplying our Fleet in the time of Peace. I have not Skill enough to compute what will be left, after theſe neceſſary Charges, towards annually clearing ſo vaſt a Debt; but believe it muſt be very little: However, it is plain that both theſe Taxes muſt be continued, as well for ſupporting the Government, as becauſe we have no other Means for paying off the Principal. And ſo likewiſe muſt all the other Funds remain for paying the Intereſt. How long a time this muſt require, how ſteady an Adminiſtration, and how undiſturbed a State of Affairs, both at home and abroad, let others determine.

However, ſome People think all this very reaſonable; and that ſince the Struggle hath been for Peace and Safety, Poſterity, who is to partake the Benefit, ought to ſhare in the Expence: As if at the breaking out of this War there had been ſuch a Conjuncture of Affairs, as never happened before, nor would ever happen again. 'Tis wonderful, that our Anceſtors, in all their Wars, ſhould never fall under ſuch a Neceſſity; that we meet no Examples of it, in *Greece* and *Rome*; that no other Nation in *Europe* ever knew any thing like it, except *Spain*, about an hundred and twenty Years ago; which they drew upon themſelves, by their own Folly, and have ſuffered for it ever ſince: No doubt, we ſhall teach Poſterity Wiſdom, but they will be apt to think the Purchaſe too dear; and I wiſh they may ſtand to the Bargain we have made in their Names.

'Tis eaſy to entail Debts on ſucceeding Ages, and to hope they

they will be able and willing to pay them; but how to insure Peace for any Term of Years, is difficult enough to apprehend. Will human Nature ever cease to have the same Passions? Princes to entertain Designs of Interest or Ambition, and Occasions of Quarrel to arise? May not we ourselves by the Variety of Events and Incidents which happen in the World, be under a Necessity of recovering Towns out of the very Hands of those, for whom we are now ruining our Country to take them? Neither can it be said, that those *States*, with whom we may probably differ, will be in as bad a Condition as ourselves; for, by the Circumstances of our Situation, and the Impositions of our Allies, we are more exhausted, than either they or the Enemy; and by the Nature of our Government, the Corruption of our Manners, and the Opposition of Factions, we shall be more slow in recovering.

It will, no doubt, be a mighty Comfort to our Grandchildren, when they see a few Rags hang up in *Westminster-Hall*, which cost an hundred Millions, whereof they are paying the Arrears, and boasting, as Beggars do, that their Grandfathers were rich and great.

I have often reflected on that mistaken Notion of Credit, so boasted of by the Advocates of the late Ministry: Was not all that Credit built upon Funds raised by the Landed Men, whom they so much hate and despise? Are not the greatest Part of those Funds raised from the Growth and Product of Land? Must not the whole Debt be entirely paid, and our Fleets and Garrisons be maintained, by the Land and Malt-Tax, after a Peace?-If they call it Credit to run ten Millions in Debt, without Parliamentary Security, by which the Publick is defrauded of almost half, I must think such Credit to be dangerous, illegal, and perhaps treasonable. Neither hath any thing gone further to ruin the Nation, than their boasted Credit. For my own part, when I saw this false Credit sink, upon the Change of the Ministry, I was singular enough to conceive it a good Omen. It seemed, as if the young extravagant Heir had got a new Steward, and was resolved to look into his Estate before things grew desperate, which made the Usurers forbear feeding him with Money, as they used to do.

Since the Monied Men are so fond of War, I should be glad, they would furnish out one Campaign at their own Charge: It is not above six or seven Millions; and I dare engage to make it out, that when they have done this, instead of contributing equal to the Landed Men, they will have their full Principal and Interest, at 6 *per Cent.* remaining of all the Money they ever lent to the Government.

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Without this Reſource, or ſome other equally miraculous, it is impoſſible for us to continue the War upon the ſame Foot. I have already obſerved, that the laſt Funds of Intereſt fell ſhort above a Million, though the Perſons moſt converſant in Ways and Means employed their utmoſt Invention; ſo that of neceſſity we muſt be ſtill more defective next Campaign. But perhaps our Allies will make up this Deficiency on our ſide, by greater Efforts on their own. Quite the contrary; both the Emperor and *Holland* failed this Year in ſeveral Articles; and ſignified to us, ſome time ago, that they cannot keep up to the ſame Proportions in the next. We have gained a noble Barrier for the latter, and they have nothing more to demand or deſire. The Emperor, however ſanguine he may now affect to appear, will, I ſuppoſe, be ſatisfied with *Naples*, *Sicily*, *Milan*, and his other Acquiſitions, rather than engage in a long hopeleſs War, for the Recovery of *Spain*, to which his Allies the *Dutch* will neither give their Aſſiſtance nor Conſent. So that ſince we have done their Buſineſs; ſince they have no further Service for our Arms, and we have no more Money to give them: And laſtly, ſince we neither deſire any Recompence, nor expect any Thanks, we ought, in pity, to be diſmiſſed, and have leave to ſhift for ourſelves. They are ripe for a Peace, to enjoy and cultivate what we have conquered for them; and ſo are we, to recover, if poſſible, the Effects of their Hardſhips upon us. The firſt Overtures from *France*, are made to *England*, upon ſafe and honourable Terms: We, who bore the Burden of the War, ought, in reaſon, to have the greateſt ſhare in making the Peace. If we do not hearken to a Peace, others certainly will; and get the Advantage of us there, as they have done in the War. We know the *Dutch* have perpetually threatened us, that they would enter into ſeparate Meaſures of a Peace; and by the Strength of that Argument, as well as by *other powerful Motives*, prevailed on thoſe, who were then at the Helm, to comply with them on any Terms, rather than put an end to a War, which every Year brought them ſuch great Acceſſions to their Wealth and Power. Whoever falls off, a Peace will follow; and then we muſt be content with ſuch Conditions, as our Allies, out of their great Concern for our Safety and Intereſt, will pleaſe to chuſe. They have no further occaſion for fighting; they have gained their Point, and they now tell us, it is *our War*; ſo that in common Juſtice it ought to be *our Peace*.

All we can propoſe, by the deſperate Steps of pawning our Land or Malt-Tax, or erecting a general Exciſe, is only to raiſe a Fund of Intereſt, for running us annually four Millions further

further in Debt, without any Proſpect of ending the War ſo well, as we can do at preſent: And when we have ſunk the only unengaged Revenues we had left, our Incumbrances muſt of neceſſity remain perpetual.

We have hitherto lived upon *Expedients*, which in time will certainly deſtroy any Conſtitution, whether civil or natural, and there was no Country in *Chriſtendom* had leſs Occaſion for them, than ours. We have dieted a healthy Body into a Conſumption, by plying it with Phyſick, inſtead of Food: Art will help us no longer; and if we cannot recover by letting the Remains of Nature work, we muſt inevitably die.

What Arts have been uſed to poſſeſs the People with a *ſtrong Deluſion*, that *Britain* muſt infallibly be ruined, without the Recovery of *Spain* to the Houſe of *Auſtria?* Making the Safety of a great and powerful Kingdom, as ours was then, to depend upon an Event, which, even after a War of miraculous Succeſſes, proves impracticable. As if Princes and great Miniſters could find no way of ſettling the publick Tranquility, without changeing the Poſſeſſions of Kingdoms, and forcing Sovereigns upon a People againſt their Inclinations. Is there no Security for the Iſland of *Britain*, unleſs a King of *Spain* be dethroned by the Hands of his Grandfather? Has the Enemy no cautionary Towns and Sea-Ports, to give us for ſecuring Trade? Can he not deliver us Poſſeſſion of ſuch Places, as would put him in a worſe Condition, whenever he ſhould perfidiouſly renew the War? The preſent King of *France* has but few Years to live, by the Courſe of Nature, and, doubtleſs, would deſire to end his Days in Peace: Grandfathers in private Families are not obſerved to have great Influence on their Grandſons, and I believe they have much leſs among Princes. However, when the Authority of a Parent is gone, is it likely that *Philip* will be directed by a Brother, againſt his own Intereſt, and that of his Subjects? Have not thoſe two Realms their ſeparate Maxims of Policy, which muſt operate in Times of Peace? Theſe at leaſt are Probabilities, and cheaper by ſix Millions a Year than recovering *Spain*, or continuing the War, both which ſeem abſolutely impoſſible.

But the common Queſtion is, if we muſt now ſurrender *Spain*, what have we been fighting for all this while? The Anſwer is ready; We have been fighting for the ruin of the Publick Intereſt, and the Advancement of a Private. We have been fighting to raiſe the Wealth and Grandeur of a particular Family; to enrich Uſurers and Stock-jobbers; and to cultivate the pernicious Deſigns of a Faction, by deſtroying the Landed-Intereſt.

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The Nation begins now to think the *Bleſſings* are not worth fighting for any longer, and therefore deſires a Peace.

But the Advocates on the other Side cry out, that we might have had a better Peace, than is now in Agitation, above two Years ago. Suppoſing this to be true, I do aſſert, that by parity of Reaſon we muſt expect one juſt ſo much worſe, about two Years hence. If thoſe in Power could then have given us a better Peace, more is their Infamy and Guilt, that they did it not; why did they inſiſt upon Conditions, which they were certain would never be granted? We allow it was in their Power to have put a good End to the War, and left the Nation in ſome hope of recovering itſelf. And this is what we charge them with as anſwerable to God, their Country, and Poſterity, that the bleeding Condition of their Fellow-Subjects, was a Feather in the Ballance with their private Ends.

When we offer to lament the heavy Debts and Poverty of the Nation, 'tis pleaſant to hear ſome Men anſwer all that can be ſaid, by crying up the Power of *England*, the Courage of *England*, the inexhauſtible Riches of *England*. I have heard a Man very ſanguine upon this Subject, with a good Employment for Life, and a hundred thouſand Pounds in the Funds, bidding us *Take Courage*, and *Warranting, that all would go well.* This is the Style of Men at eaſe, *who lay the heavy Burdens upon others, which they will not touch with one of their Fingers.* I have known ſome People ſuch ill Computers, as to imagine the many Millions in Stocks and Annuities, are ſo much real Wealth in the Nation; whereas every Farthing of it is entirely loſt to us, ſcattered in *Holland*, *Germany*, and *Spain*; and the Landed-Men, who now pay the Intereſt, muſt at laſt pay the Principal.

FOURTHLY, Thoſe who are againſt any Peace without *Spain*, have, I doubt, been ill informed, as to the low Condition of *France*, and the mighty Conſequences of our Succeſſes. As to the firſt, it muſt be confeſſed, that after the Battle of *Ramellies* the *French* were ſo diſcouraged with their frequent Loſſes, and ſo impatient for a Peace, that their King was reſolved to comply on any reaſonable Terms. But when his Subjects were informed of our exorbitant Demands, they grew jealous of his Honour, and were unanimous to aſſiſt him in continuing the War at any hazard, rather than ſubmit. This fully reſtored his Authority; and the Supplies he hath received from the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, which in all are computed, ſince the War, to amount to four hundred Millions of Livres, (and all in *Specie*) have enabled him to pay his Troops. Beſides, the Money is ſpent in his own Country; and he hath ſince waged War in the moſt

moſt thrifty manner, by acting on the Defenſive, compounding with us every Campaign for a Town, which coſt us fifty times more than it is worth, either as to the Value, or the Conſequences. Then he is at no Charge of a Fleet, further than providing Privateers, wherewith his Subjects carry on a Pyratical War at their own Expence, and he ſhares in the Profit; which hath been very conſiderable to *France*, and of infinite Diſadvantage to us, not only by the perpetual Loſſes we have ſuffered to an immenſe Value, but by the general Diſcouragement of Trade, on which we ſo much depend. All this conſidered, with the Circumſtances of that Government, where the Prince is Maſter of the Lives and Fortunes of ſo mighty a Kingdom, ſhews that Monarch to be not ſo ſunk in his Affairs, as we have imagined, and have long flattered ourſelves with the hopes of. For an abſolute Government may endure a long War, but it hath generally been ruinous to free Countries.

Thoſe who are againſt *any Peace without Spain*, ſeem likewiſe to have been miſtaken in judging our Victories, and other Succeſſes, to have been of greater Conſequence than they really were.

When our Armies take a Town in *Flanders*, the *Dutch* are immediately put into *Poſſeſſion*, and we at home make *Bonefires*. I have ſometimes pitied the deluded People, to ſee them ſquandering away their Fewel to ſo little purpoſe. For Example, What is it to us that *Bouchain* is taken, about which the warlike Politicians of the Coffee-houſe make ſuch a Clutter? What though the Garriſon ſurrendered Priſoners of War, and in ſight of the Enemy? We are not now in a Condition to be fed with Points of Honour. What Advantage have we, but that of ſpending three or four Millions more to get another Town for the States, which may open them a new Country for Contributions, and increaſe the Perquiſites of the G——l?

In that War of ten Years, under the late King, when our Commanders and Soldiers were raw and unexperienced, in compariſon of what they are at preſent, we loſt Battles and Towns, as well as we gained them of late, ſince thoſe Gentlemen have better learned their Trade; yet we bore up then, as the *French* do now: Nor was there any Thing deciſive in their Succeſſes: They grew weary, as well as we, and at laſt conſented to a Peace, under which we might have been happy enough, if it had not been followed by that wiſe Treaty of Partition, which revived the Flame, that hath laſted ever ſince. I ſee nothing elſe in the modern Way of making War, but that the Side which can hold out longeſt, will end it with moſt Advantage.

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In ſuch a cloſe Country as *Flanders*, where it is carried on by Sieges, the Army that acts offenſively, is at a much greater Expence of Men and Money; and there is hardly a Town taken in the common Forms, where the Beſiegers have not the worſe of the Bargain. I never yet knew a Soldier, who would not affirm, that any Town might be taken, if you were content to be at the Charge. If you will count upon ſacrificing ſo much Blood and Treaſure, the reſt is all a regular, eſtabliſhed Method, which cannot fail. When the King of *France*, in the Times of his Grandeur, ſat down before a Town, his Generals and Engineers would often fix the Day when it ſhould ſurrender. The Enemy, ſenſible of all this, hath for ſome Years paſt avoided a Battle, where he hath ſo ill ſucceeded, and taken a ſurer Way to conſume us, by letting our Courage evaporate againſt Stones and Rubbiſh, and ſacrificing a ſingle Town to a Campaign, which he can ſo much better afford to loſe, than we to take.

LASTLY, Thoſe who are ſo violent againſt any Peace without *Spain* being reſtored to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, have not, I believe, caſt their Eye upon a Cloud gathering in the North, which we have helped to raiſe, and may quickly break in a Storm upon our Heads.

The Northern War hath been on Foot, almoſt ever ſince our Breach with *France*; The Succeſs of it various; but one Effect to be apprehended was always the ſame, that ſooner or later it would involve us in its Conſequences, and that, whenever this happened, let our Succeſs be never ſo great againſt *France*, from that Moment *France* would have the Advantage.

By our Guaranty of the Treaty of *Travendall*, we were obliged to hinder the King of *Denmark* from engaging in a War with *Sweden*. It was at that Time underſtood by all Parties, and ſo declared even by the *Britiſh* Miniſters, that this Engagement eſpecially regarded *Denmark*'s not aſſiſting King *Auguſtus*. But, however, if this had not been ſo, yet our Obligations to *Sweden* ſtood in Force, by virtue of former Treaties with that Crown, which were all revived and confirmed by a ſubſequent one, concluded at the *Hague* by Sir *Joſeph Williamſon* and Monſ. *Lilienroot*, about the latter End of the late King's Reign.

However, the War in the North proceeded, and our not aſſiſting *Sweden*, was at leaſt as well excuſed by the War, which we were entangled in, as his not contributing his Contingent to the Empire, whereof he is a Member, was excuſed by the Preſſures he lay under, having a Confederacy to deal with.

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In this War the King of *Sweden* was victorious; and what Dangers were we not expoſed to? What Fears were we not in? He marched into *Saxony*, and if he had really been in the *French* Intereſt, might at once have put us under the greateſt Difficulties. But the Torrent turned another Way, and he contented himſelf with impoſing on his Enemy the Treaty of *Alt Raſtadt*; by which King *Auguſtus* makes an abſolute Ceſſion of the Crown of *Poland*, renounces any Title to it, acknowledges *Staniſlaus*; and then, both he and the King of *Sweden*, join in deſiring the Guaranty of *England* and *Holland*. The Q——n did, indeed, not give this Guaranty in Form; but, as a Step towards it, the Title of King was given to *Staniſlaus*, by a Letter from her M——y; and the ſtrongeſt Aſſurances were made to the *Swediſh* Miniſter, in her M——y's Name and in a Committee of Council, that the Guaranty ſhould ſpeedily be granted; and that in the mean while, it was the ſame Thing as if the Forms were paſſed.

In 1708, King *Auguſtus* made the Campaign in *Flanders*; what Meaſures he might at that Time take, or of *what Nature* the Arguments might be that he made uſe of, is not known: But immediately after he breaks through all he had done, marches into *Poland*, and re-aſſumes the Crown.

After this we apprehended that the Peace of the Empire might be endangered; and therefore entered into an Act of Guaranty for the Neutrality of it. The King of *Sweden* refuſed, upon ſeveral Accounts, to ſubmit to the Terms of this Treaty; particularly becauſe we went out of the Empire to cover *Poland* and *Jutland*, but did not go out of it to cover the Territories of *Sweden*.

Let us therefore conſider, what is our Caſe at preſent. If the King of *Sweden* returns, and gets the better, he will think himſelf under no Obligation of having any Regard to the Intereſts of the Allies; but will naturally purſue, according to his own Expreſſion, *His Enemy, where-ever he finds him.* In this Caſe the *Corps* of the Neutrality is obliged to oppoſe him, and ſo we are engaged in a ſecond War, before the firſt is ended.

If the Northern Confederates ſucceed againſt *Sweden*, how ſhall we be able to preſerve the Balance of Power in the North, ſo eſſential to our Trade, as well as in many other Reſpects? What will become of that great Support of the *Proteſtant Intereſt* in *Germany*, which is the Footing that the *Swedes* now have in the Empire? Or, who ſhall anſwer that theſe Princes, after they have ſettled the North to their Minds, may not take a Fancy to look Southward, and make our Peace with *France* according to their own Schemes?

And

And laſtly, if the King of *Pruſſia*, the Elector of *Hanover*, and other Princes whoſe Dominions lie contiguous, are forced to draw from thoſe Armies which act againſt *France*; we muſt live in hourly Expectation of having thoſe Troops re-called, which they now leave with us; and this Re-call may happen in the midſt of a Siege, or on the Eve of a Battle. Is it therefore our Intereſt, to toil on in a ruinous War, for an impracticable End, 'till one of theſe Caſes ſhall happen, or to get under Shelter before the Storm?

There is no Doubt, but the preſent Miniſtry (provided they could get over the Obligations of Honour and Conſcience) might find their Advantage in adviſing the Continuance of the War, as well as the laſt did, tho' not in the ſame Degree, after the Kingdom has been ſo much exhauſted. They might prolong it 'till the Parliament would deſire a Peace; and in the mean Time leave them in full Poſſeſſion of Power. Therefore it is plain, that their Proceedings at preſent are meant to ſerve their Country, directly againſt their private Intereſt; whatever Clamour may be raiſed by thoſe, who, for the vileſt Ends, would remove Heaven and Earth to oppoſe their Meaſures. But they think it infinitely better to accept ſuch Terms as will ſecure our Trade, find a ſufficient Barrier for the *States*, give *reaſonable Satisfaction* to the Emperor, and reſtore the Tranquility of *Europe*, though without adding *Spain* to the Empire: Rather than go on in a languiſhing Way, upon the vain Expectation of ſome improbable Turn, for the Recovery of that Monarchy out of the *Bourbon* Family; and at laſt be forced to a worſe Peace, by ſome of the Allies falling off, upon our utter Inability to continue the War.

F I N I S.